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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a framework for analyzing municipal spending behavior 
over a long time dimension. A panel data set for the period 1974 to 2008 containing 
expenditure data and other characteristics for all the municipalities constitute the basis of the 
analysis. We suggest an econometric model specification which is flexible enough to 
incorporate the major institutional and social changes of the period. We also propose and 
estimate three models over the full period. One static model, one partial adjustment model 
without and one partial adjustment model with autocorrelated errors. A discrepancy between 
the static and the dynamic parameter estimates is found and investigated, but the source has 
not been uncovered. Analysis of the dynamic models revealed that net operational deficits in 
preceding years lead to a strengthening of the net operational surplus, which is in line with 
budget rules imposed on the municipalities. By allowing for heterogeneous adjustment speed 
in the dynamic models we find that large municipalities adapt more sluggish than small ones 
to shifting demand. This means that small municipalities implement desired allocation 
changes faster. 
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1 Introduction 
Municipalities have a responsibility to provide its residents with certain services. Yet 
the services and the service standards provided have changed a lot over time. 
Throughout the 1960s many small municipalities and those on the fringe of large cities 
were forced to merge. This followed in the wake of the Schei-committee whose 
assignment had been to suggest a new municipal structure that was better prepared to 
handle an increased part of the national welfare production. Since then an increasing 
number of responsibilities have been assigned to the municipalities by the central 
government, resulting in a much more standardized set of services. Combined with 
more use of earmarked grants and strict limitations to the income tax level the autonomy 
of municipalities has been severely reduced. This means that much of the income 
available to local governments is already bound to cover the minimum required 
expenditures required by law. The remainder is discretionary income which can be 
distributed among the municipal services as the local council sees fit. 
A model of municipal sector specific expenditure, referred to as KOMMODE, has been 
developed in Statistics Norway since 1995. This is a microeconometric model that is 
based on the utility maximizing behavior of local government, and has been extensively 
documented in Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), Aaberge and Langørgen (2006), 
Langørgen, Galloway, Mogstad and Aaberge (2005) and Aaberge, Bhuller, Langørgen 
and Mogstad (2010) and Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge (2010).  
Work done at Statistics Norway has extended the data material of the model. As of 
spring 2012 the municipality data for the years 1972 to 2008 have been collected and 
prepared for analysis.1 
The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, to create a panel data set for the period 1972 to 
2008 from the available municipality data and suggest an econometric model 
specification which is flexible enough to be estimated over the entire time segment. To 
do this the institutional and political framework in which the municipalities operate 
need to be analyzed to get information on structural changes to the model parameters. 
Second, to propose a dynamic model setup based on a partial adjustment model with 
                                                 
1
 Prior to this, data has been available for 1993 and 2001-2008 
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heterogeneous adjustment speed. And to identify and correct issues related to such a 
dynamic setup.2 
The rest of the chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains brief reviews of 
papers related to the thesis. In Chapter 3 certain theoretical aspects of dynamic panel 
data modeling are explained. Chapter 4 contains the description and derivation of the 
base model for municipal spending. In chapter 5 some key changes to the institutional 
framework in which the municipalities and local government operate are presented and 
possible consequences for model specification are highlighted. Chapter 6 contains a 
presentation and a description of four different econometric models which is to be used 
in the analysis. In chapter 7 the models are compared and the parameter estimates are 
discussed. Chapter 8 contains a reflection around what has been found, what has not 
been found and suggested paths for further inquiry.  
                                                 
2
 All analysis was done using SAS software package. Program code is available on request. 
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2 Literature Review 
Several models have been developed to explain different aspects of local government 
behavior. We will go through some important papers related to the KOMMODE model. 
Also we will mention some of the research applying partial adjustment models to 
analyze the dynamics of municipal expenditure. 
In their 2003 paper ―Fiscal spending behavior of local governments: Identification of 
price effects when prices are not observed‖, Aaberge and Langørgen analyze the local 
public spending behavior in municipalities. Local government utility maximizing 
behavior is used to derive the extended linear expenditure system (ELES) for eight 
service sectors. The expenditure on each of these sectors are composed of two parts; the 
minimum required expenditure level determined by local attributes affecting the cost 
function and marginal budget shares, which is the share of the disposable income 
distributed to the sector according to local taste factors such as education level, political 
composition of the local government council and the degree of urbanization. These 
eight equations are estimated simultaneously using data from 1993. Identification in the 
absence of prices on public services is obtained by exploiting the heterogeneity of the 
municipality specific attributes assumed to influence production costs and local taste 
variables.  
A 12-sector version of the model used by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) is used in 
Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge (2010) to analyze the stability of the municipality 
behavior over the period 2001-2008. They find that most of the parameters explaining 
the minimum required expenditure of the sectors are significant and stable over time. 
Changes in parameters is attributed to either political or preference changes, dynamic 
effects that are not modeled or more general misspecification problems and plain 
statistical uncertainty. 
―A study of Norwegian local government behavior in a dynamic context‖ by Kerimova 
(2010) analyzes multiple dynamic models on the basis of a panel data set over the years 
2001-2008. Several models for handling time and municipality heterogeneity or both is 
proposed and estimated. This serves as a comparison of different approaches to dynamic 
modeling, where the advantages and shortcomings of each are discussed. A partial 
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adjustment model, explaining the sluggishness of municipality adjustment to changes in 
equilibrium, is also modeled. This model is proposed by Kerimova as a useful starting 
point for further research. 
An earlier study of partial adjustment models on municipality spending has been 
performed by Borge and Rattsø in the 1993 paper ―Dynamic responses to changing 
demand: a model of the reallocation process in small and large municipalities in 
Norway‖. They use a representative voter model where the utility of a single 
representative household is assumed maximized over an exogenous budget constraint to 
find the expenditure equations. The role of the relative service sector prices are assumed 
to be negligible, and the expenditure functions are set up as reduced form functions of 
private consumption, per capita budget and several municipality specific characteristics. 
More than 442 municipalities over the period 1984-1987 were used to estimate the 
model. The sluggishness of adjustment was found to be higher than in other countries. 
An explanation of this phenomenon is the high degree of central financing implying 
limited local accountability. Estimations of the adjustment speed were also found to be 
greater in small municipalities than in larger ones. They suggest that organizational 
complexity and poor voter control can explain this. 
In ―Local government service production: The politics of allocative sluggishness‖ from 
1995 Borge, Rattsø and Sørensen use a similar model to find the impact on adjustment 
from pressure groups. By surveying local politicians they find a measure on pressure 
from interest groups. They find that interest groups related to primary education 
increase allocative sluggishness, while those supporting child care and elderly care 
encourage faster reallocation. 
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3 Theoretical Framework 
Panel data methods have many advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data. Due 
to the extra dimension it allows more accurate inference on model parameters, attributed 
both to more degrees of freedom and higher sample variance (Hsiao, 2007). In this 
chapter we will investigate a few topics regarding to two of the other advantages panel 
data analysis provides. 
Panel data theory has methods designed to handle unobserved heterogeneity in observed 
units and over time. In any cross section numerous unmeasured variables explain the 
units we are analyzing. Failure to include these when estimating results in omitted 
variable bias. In the same way we get a bias when omitting time series variables that 
influence units uniformly. 
Also, panel data methods allow for better analysis of dynamic relationships. While time-
series analysis also can examine dynamic effects, panel data can describe more complex 
dynamic relationships with a shorter time dimension due to the number of units 
(Kennedy, 2008). 
In the following chapter we investigate issues which might arise under the presence of 
heterogeneity and dynamic model specification. Different methods designed to deal 
with such issues will be discussed, along with the costs and benefits associated with 
them. We will also discuss what to expect if such problems are left untreated. 
3.1 Unobserved heterogeneity 
Unobserved heterogeneity in panel data can take several forms. The basic assumption of 
unobserved heterogeneity according to Hsiao (2003) is when a model conditional on the 
observed explanatory variables still has an omitted variables effect, then this effect is 
driven by three main types of variables; period individual-invariant, individual time-
invariant and individual time-varying. Period individual-invariant variables are the same 
for all individuals in a certain time period, but may differ across time periods. Individual 
time-invariant variables can be different for each individual in the cross-section, but 
does not vary over time. Individual time-varying variables vary both across individuals 
and over time units. 
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Period individual-invariant heterogeneity can be handled in several ways. The first 
and obvious method is by adding time dummies for all periods to all observations in the 
model. These can interact either additively or multiplicatively with the model. These 
dummies can pick up time effects such as inflation, real growth, changes in preferences 
or politics depending on the model specification. 
Another approach to deal with time heterogeneity is to use price or income indices. If a 
reasonable index is available it can be used to transform the data before estimating, thus 
effectively removing the time trend. Using price indices to remove time trends caused 
by inflation from data is a common use of this approach.   
Time dummies generally unveil more new information than the use of an index. But 
they are also much more computationally costly and prone to cause identification 
problems. 
Unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity can be thought of as an 
individual specific intercept, kc . Several strategies are available for dealing with this 
sort of unit heterogeneity in panel data. A regression function with unobserved 
heterogeneity can be written: 
 kt kt k kt
y c   x β
, (3.1) 
 
1,...,k K ,  1,...,t T  
where ktx indicates the explanatory variables of unit k at time t and β  is the 
corresponding parameters. 
With linear pooled panel data models we can perform transformations like first-
differencing (3.2) or subtracting the data group means (3.3) to remove such effects. This 
will remove the unobserved heterogeneity, and allow parameters to be estimated 
consistently. 
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    1 1kt kt kt kt kt kty y        x x β ,     1,...,k K ,  2,...,t T  (3.2) 
 
  kt k kt k kty y    x x β ,                         1,...,k K ,  1,...,t T  (3.3) 
 
Unfortunately, such transformations do not generally work with models that are 
nonlinear in parameters.  
 
 , ,kt kt k kty h c  x β  (3.4) 
 
where h is a nonlinear function. 
Greene (2011) shows this approach is pointless. Except for some special functional 
forms such as an exponential model, the individual heterogeneity or fixed effects cannot 
be differenced away like in (3.2) and (3.3). Instead we get  
    
1
1
, , , ,
T
kt k kt k ks k kt
s
y y h c h c
T


   x β x β , (3.5) 
 
which certainly does not simplify matters. A related problem that arises when dealing 
with unobservable heterogeneity in nonlinear models such as (3.4) is that it is not 
always clear how it should enter the regression model.  
Fixed effects 
One way to handle time invariant, individual heterogeneity in a nonlinear model such as 
described in (3.4) is to use a fixed effects model (FE). The fixed effects model can be 
used in nonlinear models by adding unit specific dummy variables. In such a model all 
parameters need to be estimated simultaneously. While estimating such a system can be 
difficult in its own right, this method also creates problems through a phenomenon 
called the incidental parameter problem. Neyman and Scott (1948) found that under 
conditions such that the numbers of parameters were increasing with sample size; the 
estimators of the constant terms are not consistent. When T is fixed (and small) the 
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slope estimators then become inconsistent and biased to the degree of O(1/T). 3 In linear 
panel data models the use of least squares dummy variables (LSDV) to consistently 
estimate the slope parameters circumvents this problem. Such an easy fix does not exist 
for nonlinear panel data models, and larger time dimensions are needed to reduce the 
incidental parameter bias. One serious limitation with the FE-model is that we lose the 
contribution from variables that are constant or highly correlated over time. Such 
variables can still be included when they interact with time varying variables like time 
dummies, but we can only measure the change in their contribution, not the total 
contribution. 
Random effects 
Another approach which also works with nonlinearity is the random effects model (RE).   
As explained in Wooldridge (2009), this model requires the somewhat strong 
assumption that the unobserved individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with all 
included explanatory variables for all units and all time periods. 
  ov ,kt kC c x 0 , (3.6) 
 
1,...,k K ,  1,...,t T  
The unobserved effect is then assumed to be a component of the error term. This implies 
that the error component is serially correlated over time. The serial correlation problem 
can be solved by using generalized least squares in linear models but do not have any 
solution methods for nonlinear models (Greene, 2011). One advantage over the FE-
model is that the RE models allows variables to be constant over time. However, for the 
RE model to have good properties K should be fairly large and T should be relatively 
small.  
Pooled regression 
Still another approach is to run regressions on the panel data without correcting for 
individual time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Pesaran and Smith (1995) has 
                                                 
3
 The  O  function is used to describe the limiting behavior of a function. Used in Greene 2011  
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shown that heterogeneity in the cross-sectional units can produce severely biased 
results, even when both panel dimensions are large. This may still be preferable to the 
aforementioned methods.  
These approaches have different benefits and costs which all have to be considered in 
the light of the application. Kerimova (2011) used panel data on the period 2001-2008 
to estimate a 12-sector version of KOMMODE. She compared the results of a 
benchmark model with those from alternative models which corrected for time effects 
and/or individual fixed effects. Her analysis concluded that the estimates were 
particularly sensitive to time heterogeneity. Significant municipality fixed effects was 
also found but were far less prominent. 
Since there are reasons to believe that the KOMMODE model does explain the 
individual heterogeneity well and it uses many variables that vary little over time, the 
pooled regression seems like a useful approach. 
3.2 Dynamic model specification 
An interpretation of the predicted expenditure of an expenditure system is that it 
represents the long-term equilibrium expenditure. In a partial adjustment model the 
agents are assumed to spend time adapting to a new state when the external conditions 
change. In the same way that there are obvious welfare costs that incur when being in 
disequilibrium, there are also costs associated with shifting resources between different 
states. So the question becomes how fast the resources should be shifted towards the 
new equilibrium. 
This problem can be analyzed by setting up a quadratic cost function (Biørn, 2008).  
 
* 2 2
1( ) ( )kt kt kt kt ktC A y y B y y      (3.7) 
 
A rational agent would react to a new equilibrium *kty  by minimizing (3.7), thus 
adapting at an optimal speed of adjustment.  
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One way of estimating this adjustment speed is by setting up a dynamic model: 
 
*
1(1 )kt kt kt kty y y e      ,        0 1   (3.8) 
where 
 
*
kt kt kty x    (3.9) 
 
This is called a partial adjustment model. More generally these types of models are 
called autoregressive distributed lag (  ,ADL p q ) models with p lags on the 
endogenous variable and q lags on the exogenous variables (Patterson, 2000). The 
partial adjustment model is then a  1,0ADL  model. 
Combining (3.8) and (3.9) gives 
 
, 1(1 )kt kt k t kty x y v       (3.10) 
where 
 kt kt kt
v e  
 (3.11) 
 
By specifying the model in this way we find the long-run values of the  directly. 
Setting 
, 1kt k ty y   collapses (3.10) into kt kt kty x v  . 
This basic model creates the framework used for analysis of dynamic relationships in 
later chapters.  
Two main types of bias are typically associated with a dynamic model specification 
(Hsiao, 2003). One comes from ignoring correlation between time persistent errors and 
lagged dependent variables. This results in a bias which does not depend on the time 
dimension of the panel. The other type of bias arises when the initial observation is 
modeled incorrectly. This is also known as the initial condition problem and causes a 
bias which diminishes when the time dimension increases. If the time dimension is 
short, the bias can be eliminated by utilizing information of the dynamic structure of the 
error term.  
11 
 
3.2.1 Autocorrelated errors 
In dynamic models using lagged dependent variables the presence of autocorrelated 
errors can severely influence the parameter estimates. A partial adjustment model as 
discussed above uses the characteristic that the lagged endogenous variable is not 
contemporaneously correlated with the error term to consistently estimate the 
parameters. Kennedy (2008) advises to routinely test for autocorrelated errors whenever 
lagged dependent variables are used. In the following section we will examine the bias 
on the speed of adjustment parameter in partial adjustment models when error terms are 
autocorrelated. 
If we assume (3.10) is correctly specified we could expect the error term to be spherical 
and estimates of the adjustment speed to be unbiased. However, if we allow there to be 
some unobserved misspecification of the model, things no longer would be as straight 
forward.  
By rewriting  (3.10)  as a more general form and dropping the unit specific index to 
simplify the notation. 
 1t t t ty x y v      (3.12) 
where   
   and  1    
We can recover the coefficients of (3.10) 
 
 1





, (3.13) 
  1   , (3.14) 
 
Assuming the error term to follow an autoregressive process of order one (AR(1)) we 
can restate the disturbance as 
 1t t tv v w   ,           1   (3.15) 
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Where the tw  is ‖white noise‖. ’The system (3.12) and (3.15) has the following 
properties: 
 ( | ) 0tE w x  (3.16) 
 
 ( | ) 0tE v x  (3.17) 
 
 
2
2
    , 0
( | )
, 0
t t j j
j
E v v
j

 

 
 

x  (3.18) 
 
The presence of serial correlation in the disturbances will usually be due to some 
systematic relationship which the model fails to incorporate. If this relationship cannot 
be found and modeled correctly it is crucial that the error process is taken into account 
when estimating the dynamic relationship. 
Equations (3.12) and (3.15) can be written 
 1 1t t t t t
y x y v w       . (3.19) 
 
It is then obvious that if we ignore the autocorrelation in the error term and estimate the 
adjustment inertia, γ, in (3.12) with ordinary least squares (OLS) we get an endogeneity 
bias due to the omitted variable. Following the approach used by Griliches (1961) we 
estimate the inertia parameter in (3.12) with OLS 
 
1 1.
ˆ
t t t
ols
v y xplim b          . (3.20) 
  
where .yx zb is the regression coefficient of x in an auxiliary regression . .yx z yz xy b x b z  .  
 
 
Using Slutsky’s theorem and convergence in probability together with the property of 
zero correlation between the exogenous variable and the error term   1 0t tE v x   we 
find: 
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 
   
 
 
 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
Slutsky
, ,1 1
,1
. 2 2
1 11 1
2 2
,1 1 1
lim
lim
1 1
1
1
t t t t t t t t
t t t
t tt t
tt
v y v x x y v y
v y x
t tt t
t t t
y x y x
y x
Ep M v y p
p M y y E y
b b b b
plim b plim plim
r r
v y
r
     
     
   
 
 
 

  
  
   
   
   
      
   
  
   
      
 
 

  ,1 2
1
1 tty xr   




 (3.21) 
  
where  M  is the empirical covariance,  
2
r  is the correlation and 
 
 1 1
1 1
1 1
,
,t t
t t
v y
t t
M v y
M y y
b
 
 
 
 . 
Since (3.12) can be written like sums of diminishingly influencing past regressors and 
error terms 
 
0 0
s s
t t s t s
s s
y x v  
 
 
 
    (3.22) 
 
and we know that ( ) 0t tE v x    and  
2( ) st t sE v v    we get 
 
2
2
0 0
( ) ( )
1
s s s
t t t t s
s s
E v y E v v

   

 

 
  

  . (3.23) 
 
Then we can write (3.21) as 
  
   1 1 ,1
1
2
. 2 2
1
11t t t t t
t
v y x
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. (3.24) 
 
Finally we receive an expression of the asymptotic bias  
    
   ,1
1
2
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 
  
   

 
    
   
. (3.25) 
 
The OLS estimate of the inertia parameter will be biased when the error term follows a 
first order autoregressive process. When the persistence parameter ( ) of the AR(1) 
process is positive then the inertia parameter is over estimated. It is worth noticing that 
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the bias disappears when 0  , meaning we are back to the well behaved case of the 
classical linear regression model and OLS is BLUE4 
 
 
0
ˆ
0
olsbias

 


 
    (3.26) 
 
 
0
ˆ
0
olsbias

 


 
    (3.27) 
 
This also means that the speed of adjustment parameter  1   will be under 
estimated. The under estimation will be aggravated by a high persistence parameter in 
the AR(1) process. This seems logical given that OLS is unbiased when the persistence 
is zero. A high adjustment speed will reduce the amount of under estimation.  
When estimating municipality expenditure, we already have established that there are 
some fixed effects present which we do not pay attention to. This will result in 
autocorrelation in a distributed lag model since the heterogeneity in time t  will be 
correlated with the unit heterogeneity in time 1t   through the lagged dependent 
variable. Thus, a dynamic analysis of municipality spending behavior should investigate 
the presence of such autocprocesses in the error terms.  
3.2.2 Initial condition problem 
A common problem in models with lagged dependent variables is that the parameter 
estimates can be very sensitive to the modeling of the initial values. 
Given a simple dynamic model following an AR(1) process: 
 1t t t ty x y v      (3.28) 
 
  0 1 1| , ,..., 0t tE v y y y    (3.29) 
 
0( ,..., )t t T ,    1    
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  ty can then be rewritten as a process of the form: 
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0
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1 1
1
0 1
t t t t
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 
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 



 X X  (3.31) 
 
Equation (3.31) shows that the initial condition of the lagged dependent variable will 
influence the regression. The adjustment speed estimated on short panels under the 
assumption that 0 |y X follows such a process will be inconsistent if this assumption 
turns out to be is false. When the time dimension is larger it does not matter much if the 
regression is estimated conditional on the initial value or not. The question to ask 
according to Arrelano (2003) is if the initial conditions at the start of the sample are 
representative with the steady state behavior of the model or not. An example suggested 
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) is a time series that started after historical events 
such as wars. If one estimates growth rates, the GDP of European countries after World 
War 2 cannot be assumed to be in a steady state. 
In our analysis of municipality spending behavior using the full panel data set, we 
should not be concerned with initial condition bias. For shorter panel data sets this can 
be an issue, but we should have a reason to assume that the municipality spending is 
outside a steady state level. 
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4 The Baseline Model 
4.1 Model description 
The model of municipal spending behavior, KOMMODE, uses municipality specific 
cross-section characteristics to explain variations in expenditures. Income and spending 
data from the local government accounts in Norway is used to create 12 separate service 
sector definitions, which are supposed to be comparable over time. 
1. Administration 
2. Primary schools 
3. Other education 
4. Child care 
5. Health care 
6. Social assistance 
7. Child protection 
8. Long-term care 
9. Culture 
10. Municipal roads 
11. Water supply and sanitation 
12. Other infrastructure 
 
These twelve expenditure categories together with the net operating surplus are the 
endogenous variables in the model. The accounting definitions are designed such that 
these endogenous variables always sum up to equal the revenues in every municipality. 
This relation is the underlying budget constraint. 
The expenditure in each sector is explained by two parts. The first part is the minimum 
required expenditure and the other part is the desired share of the discretionary income 
used in this sector. Minimum required expenditure can be viewed as the cost of 
providing the level of service required by law, or a level commonly agreed to be 
acceptable. Differences in such subsistence expenditure are explained by municipality 
specific characteristics such as demographic, geographic or social factors. The 
discretionary income is defined as the remaining income after the minimum expenditure 
has been covered in all sectors. This is the part of the income which local governments 
are free to distribute among their favored sectors. This relative distribution is called the 
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marginal budget share, and is assumed to be influenced by ―taste‖ characteristics such 
as political composition of the local council, population education level and settlement 
density.  
The econometric model consists of twelve structural equations, each corresponding to 
one of the service sectors, which are estimated simultaneously. Each equation consists 
of one endogenous expenditure variable explained by a selection of appropriate 
exogenous variables on municipality characteristics, while the exogenous ―taste‖ 
variables explains the use of discretionary income. 
All variables have been transformed to per capita values in thousands of kroner where it 
is meaningful to do so. This means that interpreting the parameter estimates becomes 
easy and consistent. For instance, if the variable ―kilometers of municipality owned road 
per capita‖ in the municipal roads sector has a parameter value of 20, then the 
interpretation is that an extra kilometer of municipal road per capita increases the 
expenditure need of the sector by 20000 kroner per capita.  
4.2 Model specification 
Using a notation close to that of Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) and Kerimova (2011) 
the model can be derived. 
The municipality budget constraint is defined as 
 0
1
s
i i
i
y u p q

   (4.1) 
 
where y is total income. This income definition can be seen as an aggregate of user fees, 
exogenous income such as general grants-in-aid from central government, income tax 
and property tax. Unit price  ip  and quantity  iq  determines the municipality 
expenditure in each of the s  sectors, iii qpu   )0( i . Budget surplus is given by 0u . 
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The production function of services in a certain sector  
 
 ,i i i iq f x z ,      1,...,i s  (4.2) 
 
depends on the factor input vector ix  as well as a vector of municipality characteristics 
iz that affects production opportunities. By assuming constant returns to scale and cost 
minimizing, the cost function is given by 
    , , ,i i i i i i i iC q p q w z w z  (4.3) 
 
Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) argue that since factor prices iw are set in a centralized 
system of bargaining, most of the variation of unit prices can be attributed to iz . 
Local governments maximize a Stone-Geary utility function 
      00 1 0 0
1
, ,..., i
s
s i i
i
W u q q u q
 
 

    (4.4) 
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0
1
s
i
i


  (4.5) 
 
and ii  10  , iiq   , 00 u  is satisfied. 
The parameters i  and 0 can be given the interpretation of the minimum acceptable 
quantities of local government service and minimum allowed net operating surplus 
respectively. 
Maximizing (4.4) subject to the budget constraint (4.1) and (4.5) allows us to find an 
extended linear expenditure system (ELES) 
 





 

s
i
iiii yu
1
0  ,         si ,...,1  (4.6) 
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The minimum required expenditure in service sector i  is iii p  )0( i .  
 
1
s
i
i
 

  (4.7) 
 
is the minimum required expenditure on total public service. The discretionary income 
is defined as which 0
1
s
i
i
y  

   is distributed between the different sectors by their 
marginal budget shares i .  
Equation (4.6) may be decomposed as; the expenditure in sector i is determined by the 
minimum required expenditure, in addition to the marginal budget share of discretionary 
income. 
To achieve identification of the expenditure system (4.6) an additional restriction is 
needed in the absence of observable prices. Pollak and Wales (1978) described an 
approach they called ―translating‖ the system. By allowing parameters to be 
heterogeneous with identifying functional form, a fully identified version of the 
expenditure system is derived.  
Heterogeneity in cost parameters can be explained by the municipality characteristics 
that affects the production function (4.2), while the marginal budget shares, or taste 
parameters, are explained by factors assumed to influence local government priorities.  
 

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k
j
jijii z
1
0  ,        si ,...,1  (4.8) 
 


m
j
jijii v
1
0  ,         si ,...,1  (4.9) 
 
These equations account for minimum required expenditures per capita (4.8) and 
marginal budget share (4.9)  of each sector given observable municipality characteristics 
z and local government taste variables v . In service sectors which do not target the 
entire population5 the constant terms are excluded. This is a fair assumption since these 
                                                 
5 Primary schools, other education, child care, social services, child protection and long-term care. 
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sector expenses must be allowed to vary with the target groups, also it helps identifying 
the system. 
For (4.5) to hold we also need to impose two additional restrictions. 
 


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i
ij
0
0  (4.10) 
 


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i
i
0
0 1  (4.11) 
 
4.3 Basic panel data model 
The most basic panel data model of KOMMODE is just a pooled panel model. Each 
observation of a municipality in time is basically treated as a separate municipality. The 
municipality index k is implicit in this and in later panel models. 
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
 
    
 
  , (4.12) 
 
1,...,12i  ,   1,...,t T ,   1,...,k K  
The error terms of the sectors have zero expected mean and are contemporaneously 
correlated due to the interactions of the endogenous variables throughout the system. 
  | 0itE  X  (4.13) 
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
X  (4.14) 
 
1,...,12i  ,   1,...,t T ,   (all exogenos variable)X  
If variables change over time due to political changes, social changes or inflation and 
real growth then estimating this model over long time intervals will obviously lead to 
biased results due to misspecification. Earlier estimations by Kerimova (2011) and 
Pedersen (2008) has shown that parameters change a great deal. Preliminary studies 
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using the cross-sectional version of KOMMODE over the period 1972-2000 also 
support this. For instance, it is obvious that the minimum required expenditures of the 
different sectors have changed a great deal from 1972 to 2008 in nominal terms.  
If variables explaining such change are not included in the model, then omitted 
variables or comparability problems will produce biased estimates. We will deal with 
such problems in panel data models in chapter 6. It may be worth noticing that this 
model collapses to the cross-section model derived above when the time interval only 
includes one period. 
4.4 Price and expenditure indices  
Price and income indices are used in able to compare observations that may not be 
directly comparable. If we were to compare GDP between different countries by 
looking only at numbers measured in national currencies would make no sense. A 
currency exchange index needs to be used to perform such a comparison. This is the 
comparability problem. In the same way an index is needed to compare nominal 
variables from different points in time. Because of inflation and real growth we need to 
use different indices depending on what we want to compare. 
A price index measuring municipality consumption prices is used to separate out 
inflation effects from nominal variables. This can be used to remove the part of the time 
heterogeneity present in the models attributed to price change. Local public 
consumption is defined as the total cost of goods and services used by the municipalities 
and counties. This is composed of the cost of the goods and services produced directly 
by the municipalities excluding whatever fee income that might have been charged, and 
the cost of goods and services bought from the private sector.6  
The yearly growth rate of municipal consumption can be written as the relative change 
in price of municipality consumption.  
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


 , (4.15) 
 
                                                 
6
 Purchase of  private goods and services amounted to 7% of municipality consumption in 2007  (TBU, 2008). 
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or equivalently  
   11t t tP g P   (4.16) 
 
Where tP  is the price level in year t , tP is the price level in year 1t   and tg is the price 
growth in year t  (Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge, 2010). Equation (4.16) allows us 
to find the relative price index between different years. By normalizing the price index 
of a base year to 1, we get a series of price indices describing the price level relative to 
the base year. Data on yearly growth of municipality consumption is collected and 
presented in the Norwegian National Accounts. Since there has been positive growth in 
municipal prices throughout the period relevant for this thesis, the price index is 
increasing over time. We can use the following notation to indicate the municipality 
consumption price adjusted values. 
 itit
t
u
u
P
 ,          tt
t
y
y
P
 . (4.17) 
 
where itu is the expenditure in sector i  in year t . Likewise ty is the income in year t  
measured in base year prices. 
As an alternative way to account for time heterogeneity we construct an income index 
or a series of sector specific expenditure indices. In long panel datasets the relative 
expenditures in the different sectors will typically change a lot as priorities change over 
time. A sector specific index can be used to control for this type of heterogeneity. Such 
an expenditure index can be constructed by measuring the relative population weighted 
average sector expenditure of one year relative to that of a base year. 
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1,...,i s ,    1,...,t T  
Population in municipality k in year t is denoted ktn while tn is the aggregate population 
in year t . We can express the inflation adjusted sector expenditure index as 
 
, ,
1it t it it
it
i base base i base t t
u P u S
S
u P u P P
   . (4.20) 
 
This means that , 1i baseS  , and as long as the same base year is used for the price index 
, 1i baseS  . Since these expenditure indices pick up how sectors have been prioritized 
over time as well as real income growth, an expenditure index from a year preceding the 
base year need not have a value below that of the base year.  
We now have different deflators which can be used to control for time heterogeneity in 
our models. In the following chapters we will use the different types of deflators 
extensively. Throughout this thesis 2008 will be used as base year. 
More information on the different index values can be found in appendix A. 
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5 Institutional Context 
The provision of public services in Norway is divided between the state, the county and 
the municipalities. Which services fall under the different administrative levels has 
changed several times in the recent past. We aim to analyze a model describing the 
sector-specific expenditures of municipalities over the time span of 1972-2008. Keeping 
track of the responsibilities assigned to the municipalities within each sector then 
becomes important. This kind of information is especially important when deciding 
whether to include structural changes in the model. 
5.1 Short description of important events 
5.1.1 Social reforms 
Nursing homes 
The responsibility of providing nursing homes was in 1988 transferred from county to 
municipal governments. There was a consensus that this assignment had become a 
natural part of the elderly care services, which was the responsibility of the 
municipalities. It was assumed that placing similar services under the responsibility of a 
single governing level would provide better overview of the services provided to the 
group and improve the service as a whole. The municipalities were compensated by 
getting a higher grant-in-aid from the central government according to their share of 
―inhabitants 80 years or older‖. 
Mentally disabled 
A social reform was introduced in 1991, deinstitutionalizing the care of mentally 
disabled persons as well as defining their rights to many different services. With the 
reform the responsibilities to provide schooling, childcare, housing, activity and health 
services, which before had been poorly defined, became entirely that of the municipality 
(St.Meld. nr. 67 (1986-87)). With the dismantling of the county institutions program 
approximately 5000 users where moved to housing projects in their home municipality. 
With those that stayed in the municipality in which they had earlier been 
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institutionalized followed a special grant designed to compensate for the extra cost. 
Only two years after the reform the number of mentally disabled persons with offers to 
live in a fitting housing arrangement had increased from 4600 to 7000 (Sosialt Utsyn 
2000). 
School reform 
A school reform in 1997 extended the obligations of the municipalities to offer primary 
education. Most notable was the extension to the length of the primary school education 
by an extra year. The municipalities were compensated trough the grant-in-aid system. 
The reform also made it mandatory to offer a before and after school program, for 
which they received compensation trough a designated grant as well as over the block 
grant system.  
5.1.2 The grant reform of 1986             
Other types of reform may also influence local government behavior. Financial reforms 
change how municipalities get their income and how they can spend it.  
From 1970 to 1985 the income of the municipalities only grew from 15.2 percent to 17 
percent of GDP (NOU 1997:8).  But the composition of the income changed 
dramatically. Extended use of expenditure reimbursements and earmarked grants had 
increased the dependence on transfers from the central government. From 1974 to 1985 
such transfers as share of total municipal incomes more than doubled. The many 
different earmark grants and reimbursement schemes made the income system overly 
complex. This made it difficult for local governments to predict future income and to 
plan ahead.  
In 1986 the financing of the local public sector in Norway was reformed (Ot.prp. nr. 48 
(1984-85)). The new finance system set up to equalize tax income and spending needs 
across municipalities. A block grant system based on objective criteria such as 
demographic structure was meant to capture differences in spending needs. The reform 
process started two years earlier when the government created two grants based on 
objective criteria to simplify the financing of the health service and the social service. In 
1986 block grants also replaced much of the financing of the primary school sector and 
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the culture sector. In this process around 50 earmarked grants was replaced by the block 
grant system.  
Figure 5.1. Composition of municipality income, percent 
 
Source: Norwegian municipal accounts 
The reform can easily be seen in figure 5.1 as a sharp decrease in earmarked transfers 
countered by a sharp increase in general grant. It is also apparent that the use of 
earmarked grants has been steadily increasing since the reform. This is not surprising 
since earmarked grants are important political tools used to coerce municipalities to 
adopt the desired changes. In the next segment we highlight some important earmarked 
grants that have been increasing after 1986.  
5.1.3 Earmarked grants 
Child care grants 
Much of the increase in the use of earmarked grants after the general block grant reform 
in 1986 as indicated by figure 5.1 can be attributed to the increase in child care grants. 
This grant was intended to be included in the general block grant system, but practical 
difficulties concerning the financing of private day care centers repeatedly delayed such 
integration (Ot.prp. nr 48. 1984-85). Frequently being the target of political attention 
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and aspirations also made it a difficult earmark to remove. The grant was mainly 
awarded per child, although somewhat differentiated according to age and number of 
hours of care per week.  Between 1985 and 2000 the nominal size of the grant grew 
from 661 million to 4584 million yearly. This is still over 300 percent growth when 
adjusting for municipality service price increase. 
Host-municipality grants 
The social reform in 1991 concerning the care of the mentally disabled was 
accompanied by a special purpose grant. When the county run institutions for the 
mentally disabled were closed, many of the former users did not relocate back to their 
home municipalities. The grant was given to the host-municipalities where the 
institutions were located to compensate for the cost this incurred. The grant, in nominal 
terms, increased from 850 million in 1992 to about 2200 million in 1996.7 Since 1996 
the costs are slowly being phased out as the number of former institution users also 
decrease over time.  
Elderly care grants 
The elderly care initiative from 1998 led to a massive increase in a few earmarked 
grants. The operating grant for elderly care services was increased yearly by 810 
million, from just 504 million in 1997 to 3495 million in 2001 in nominal terms  
according to Hole and Gjelsvik (2007). The number of elderly people older than 67 
years of age and a measure of mortality was used as criteria for distribution of the 
grants, conditional on the actual production in the service sector (Riksrevisjonen 
Dokument Nr. 3:9 (2003-04)). 
5.2 Accounting data quality 1972-2008 
Statistics Norway receives detailed reports from Norwegian local government accounts 
each year. By definitions described in Langørgen et al (2005), Langørgen (2012b) and 
(2012c) the local government accounting items are aggregated up to explain the 
                                                 
7
 Source: TBU:1991 - TBU:2000 
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municipality expenditure in twelve separate service sectors. This aggregation has been 
performed for each municipality from 1972 to 2008. 
Changes to the accounting practices in 1983, 1991 and in 2001 have made it necessary 
to ―translate‖ the modern expenditure definitions when using older account data. This 
translation makes the definitions comparable over time, but when performing analysis 
on panels which stretches over two or more of these accounting regimes we need to pay 
special attention to structural change. Special notice should also be paid to the other 
infrastructure sector as it contains expenditure information associated with municipality 
run/owned commercial activity. The issue is that a lot less of this activity was written to 
the sector after the accounting change in 1991 than before. Social assistance sector 
expenditures are also reported to experience some inconsistencies before and after 1991. 
5.3 Structural changes  
Social and financial reforms can be expected to change the parameters of the model. 
Such changes need to be modeled explicitly to avoid misspecification of the model and 
biased estimates. In some cases these changes are unambiguously linked to a certain 
variable, but it may not always be so clear-cut. Due to the long time dimension it is also 
necessary to model larger social trends. One approach to find such trends by analyzing 
preliminary cross-sectional estimates of the model.   
The administration sector is influenced by the 2001 change in accounting definitions. 
Panel data estimation over this year should control for this change. 
Primary school sector experienced an increase in expenditure with the 1997 primary 
school reform. The parameter estimating the cost of share of population in primary 
school age is expected to change. 
Other education sector is subject to several structural changes. Before- and after school 
programs have been available in Norway in different forms since the 19th century. With 
the introduction of the law of child care from 1953 a framework standardizing the 
organization of such programs was established (NOU 1996:13). Before the 1980s the 
program mostly existed in the big cities, and in small scale in other municipalities up to 
1990. The rules governing the program and its funding were revised in 1991, leading to 
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a tremendous growth in the number of participating children.  With the 1997 school 
reform each municipality was required to provide after school programs. Children in 
primary school age with parents working full time can be expected to have extra need 
for before- and after school programs. Setting the parameter for this variable equal to 
zero before 1991 will better explain this sector as this was not a common municipal 
service prior to this. Special schooling of refugees is also the responsibility of the 
municipalities. The preliminary studies indicated that the contribution from such groups 
was not statistically significant prior to 1991.   
Child care expenses have been steadily increasing throughout the period. An obvious 
trend has been that the service has increasingly been targeting the entire population of 
children in pre-school age. Preliminary cross-sectional studies suggest that special need 
groups such as children with working parents and children with single provider 
explained more of the variation in the seventies and early eighties. Social assistance 
service costs should increase with the share of refugees after the implementation of an 
integration grant in 1991. The grant is not earmarked but is assumed to exemplify the 
expenditure need of the refugees in the municipality. Since refugees who trigger the 
grant and other refugees are assumed to have overlapping needs, both groups should 
explain expenditure variation in this sector. Another trend in the social assistance sector 
is the amount of expenditure variation explained by the divorced or separated share of 
the population. While this group explains quite a lot of the expenditure in the early 
years, its effect seems to diminish with time.  
Long-term care sector expenditures per capita increased significantly in 1988. The 
cause of which being the reform of elderly care where the responsibility of nursing 
homes was transferred from the county to the municipalities. The municipalities 
received extra transfers for the share of population 80 years or older, and it is expected 
that this group becomes more costly after the reform.  
The Culture sector per capita expenditures are mostly stable throughout the period. But 
the parameters seem to be sensitive to the shifts in accounting regimes. This may be due 
to changes in how the administrative expenses in the sector are recorded. In 1986 the 
earmarked culture grants was moved into the block grant system. 
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The remaining sectors (health care, child protection and the three infrastructure sectors) 
are not affected by any clear structural brakes. There is however a comparability 
problem in the expenditure level of the ―other infrastructure‖ sector as mentioned in 
chapter 5.2. This causes the expenditure levels to be overstated prior to 1991. This 
needs to be taken into account when estimating the model. 
In order to explain the net operating surplus sector in a dynamic framework, a fruitful 
point of departure is to examine the rules of fiscal policy imposed on the local 
governments by the central government. The law of municipalities from 1954 placed 
firm restrictions on the budgets proposed by local councils (Hole and Gjelsvik, 2007). 
The chief administrative officer was required to control the legality of all decisions 
made by the local councils. Municipalities had to follow a balanced budget regime. Any 
deficit was to be covered in entirety by the next budget. In rare cases the chief 
administrative officer could allow the municipalities to cover a deficit over a period of a 
few years. Any operating surplus was also restricted and could only be spent on capital 
purposes. They could not be allocated to cover expenditures in later years. In 1993 the 
laws governing net operating surpluses were liberalized, allowing direct transfers 
between the budgets of subsequent years. The idea being that greater budgeting 
flexibility facilitates better long term planning. The next change to the budgeting rules 
came with the 2001 revision of the law of municipalities. This further liberalized the 
budgetary rules of the municipalities. Now only the local governments who either 
planned to run a deficit or were in the process of covering an earlier deficit needed to 
get their budgets approved by the chief administrative officer. These municipalities 
were placed in the ―Register for State Review and Approval of Financial Obligations‖8  
(Hopland, 2012). Municipalities outside this register now had complete freedom to raise 
loans and shift funds between budget years. 
                                                 
8
 Usually called the ROBEK-list from the abbreviation of the Norwegian expression. 
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6 Panel Data Models 
To perform the analysis we will propose four different econometric models. Each model 
is a system of twelve equations estimated simultaneously with full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML). Throughout all the models the data will always be 
reported in 2008 prices. The municipality subscript k is dropped from all models for the 
sake of simplicity. And if nothing else is specified the error term of each sector is 
assumed to have conditional expected value of zero, and are correlated across sectors 
but not across time periods. The models proposed for analysis are: 
(Model 1)  Static model with multiplicative time effects 
(Model 2)  Static model with sector specific expenditure indices 
(Model 3)  Partial adjustment model with sector specific expenditure indices 
(Model 4) Partial adjustment model with sector specific expenditure indices and 
autocorrelated error terms 
6.1 Static model with multiplicative time effects 
The first model is a static panel data model with multiplicative time effect. These effects 
are assumed to scale the minimum required expenditure of each sector. Inflation has 
been removed from all expenditure and income variables by transforming them with the 
municipality price index. This leaves real income growth and other unobservable effects 
affecting sector growth to be explained by the time parameters. Such effects can be 
regulatory regime changes and changes to government policy. 
Model 1 
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0
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 
  (6.1) 
 
i = 1,...,12 ,   1t = ,...,T  
where i  is the sector index and t  is the time index. 
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The time effects are modeled by having them interact with time dummies 
 1td t year   for each year and multiplying them to the minimum required 
expenditure. All the time dummy parameters in the net operating surplus sector are 
fixed equal to one, 0 1t  . Both since it is not meaningful to measure the time effect in 
this sector and to ensure identification. In order to easily interpret the time dummy 
estimates we normalize the last parameter in each sector to unity, , 1T i  . The other 
time parameters will then capture individual-invariant time heterogeneity such as real 
income growth and inter-sectorial priorities relative to the base year. 
6.2 Static model with sector specific expenditure 
deflators 
Time heterogeneity can be dealt with in other ways than estimating dummy parameters. 
In this model we use the inflation corrected sector specific expenditure level itS  to 
transform away much of the unobserved sector variation. 
Model 2 
12
0
it it it it t it it it
i
u S y S   

 
    
 
  (6.2) 
 
i = 1,...,12 ,   1t = ,...,T  
where i  is the sector index and t  is the time index. 
The predicted minimum required expenditures of a certain year can be recovered by 
scaling the predicted alphas with the expenditure index of that year. Scaling with the 
price adjusted expenditure index gives us the minimum required expenditures in base 
year prices (6.3), while scaling with only the expenditure index gives us the minimum 
required expenditures in nominal prices (6.4). 
 ˆ ˆbaseit it itS   (6.3) 
 
 ˆ ˆ
nom
it it itS   (6.4) 
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6.3 Partial adjustment model with sector specific 
expenditure deflators 
By using model 2 as a formulation for the equilibrium values in a modified version of 
the dynamic model (3.10) we can set up a partial adjustment model.   is the adjustment 
speed parameter, measuring the rate at which the municipalities shift resources to move 
from a past expenditure level to the equilibrium level.  
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where i  is the sector index and t  is the time index. 
One thing that separates this model from (3.10) is that the real income growth is 
distributed among the service sectors as estimated by the delta parameters. This limits 
overestimation of the adjustment speed caused by income growth. We require the real 
income growth to be fully distributed among all twelve service sectors and the net 
operating surplus sector, which implies (6.7). 
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This requirement also assures that the budget constraint (4.1) holds. Using equations 
(6.5), (6.7) and the zero expected mean assumption of the error terms we can write: 
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The dynamic models use a modified version of the equation explaining net operating 
surplus. This is a quasi-dynamic equation which allows current net operating surplus to 
be influenced by past deficits.  
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where 
 ,
1 0t o tu      (6.10) 
 
This relation is assumed to hold due to the rules explained in chapter 5.3 where 
successive net operational deficits are prohibited. Deficits in earlier periods should then 
strengthen the current net operating surplus. When explaining net operating surplus with 
(6.9) we lose the first two years of observations. A full blown dynamic net operating 
equation would have required an extension to a model with an intertemporal budget 
constraint. 
Combining (6.5) and (6.6) gives us the final model 
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Model 3 
i = 1,...,12 ,   2t = ,...,T  
 
where i  is the sector index and t  is the time index. 
We want a model where different hypothesis on the dynamic behavior of the local 
governments can be easily tested. One way to do this is to allow for heterogeneity in the 
adjustment speed. 
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With (6.12) we assume that different factors influence the adjustment speed. These 
factors can be seen as a subset of the cost and taste factors determining the minimal 
required expenditure level and the marginal budget share of the disposable income. 
This means we can estimate how the different variables influence adjustment speed. 
Especially we want to check the results found by Borge and Rattsø (1993) suggesting 
slower adjustment speed in larger municipalities.  
6.4 Partial adjustment model with sector specific 
expenditure deflators and autocorrelated error 
terms 
Earlier work by Kerimova (2011) has suggested that there is some unobserved 
individual heterogeneity present in the model. Such a model will produce 
autocorrelation in the error terms since the fixed effects in one period will be correlated 
with the fixed effects in the following period through the lagged dependent variable. As 
shown in chapter 3.2.1 the estimates of the dynamic parameters in such a model can be 
seriously biased when the serial correlation is neglected. To deal with such problems a 
version of the dynamic model with error terms following a stable autoregressive process 
of order one is proposed. In preliminary studies, other possible autoregressive error 
specifications have been investigated but have not been found to add much to the 
analysis. 
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Model 4 
 , 1it i t it
v v w    (6.14) 
 
i = 1,...,12 ,   2t = ,...,T ,    
where i  is the sector index and t  is the time index. We also assume 1  and that itw is 
―white noise‖. Except for the error term this model is identical to model 3.  
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7 Estimation Results 
Looking at a panel data set with over 400 units and a long time dimension, the sheer 
number of observation makes it relatively easy to obtain statistically significant 
estimates. This makes it necessary to also consider the economic significance of our 
results. Earlier work on the KOMMODE model has produced some sets of variables 
that explain the minimum required expenditure in the different sectors well. Much time 
during the writing of this thesis has also been applied to finding such a set that works 
for the entire range of the panel data set.  
Two different specifications for the minimum required expenditures are used depending 
on the time interval to be estimated. A basic specification is used for shorter intervals, 
while an extended specification is used to estimate over 1974-2008. 
Basic specifications for minimum required expenditures 
The basic setup includes only a few structural changes. The reforms regarding the care 
for the mentally disabled, and the financing of refugees and afterschool programs 
suggest that variables explaining these expenses should be omitted prior to the reforms. 
This is done by setting the parameters to zero for the appropriate segment. These 
parameters are described in table 7.1 below. Misspecification due to parameters 
changing over time is handled by estimating the model on sub-segments rather than on 
the full interval of the dataset.  
Table 7. 1. Basic minimum required expenditure specifications 
Sector Variable Active since:
Other education Children in primary school age without working parents. ..............................................................................1991
Other education Refugees with integration grants...............................................................................1986
Social assistance Refugees with integration grants. ..............................................................................1991
Social assistance Refugees without integration grants. ..............................................................................1991
Long-term care Mentally disabled adult with grant. ..............................................................................1991
Long-term care Mentally disabled adult without grant. ..............................................................................1991  
Extended specifications for minimum required expenditures 
Estimating the models over several segments is a simple way to deal with 
misspecification problems. In order to estimate over the full panel data set such changes 
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in the parameters still need to be dealt with to get consistent estimates. This can be done 
by using knowledge about the institutional framework and social changes to explicitly 
model the structural changes described in 5.3. Descriptive statistics and other 
examinations of the available data should also be used to create a specification of the 
model that fits well over the entire dataset. The extended model setup will include many 
structural changes to reduce misspecification problems.  Table 7.2 illustrates the 
structural changes we have found to be fitting. 
Table 7.2. Structural changes in the extended specification 
1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2004
Administration Constant term...........................................................................................................
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................
Primary school Population in elementary school age...........................................................................................................
Population 13-15 years of age..........................................................................................................
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district...........................................................................................................
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................
Other education Constant term...........................................................................................................
Population in primary school age...........................................................................................................
Children in child care age w/ emloyed providers...........................................................................................................
Refugees living 5 years or less in Norway..........................................................................................................
Child Care Population in child care age..........................................................................................................
Children in child care age w/ employed providers...........................................................................................................
Children in child care age w/ single provider..........................................................................................................
Health care Constant term...........................................................................................................
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district...........................................................................................................
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................
Social assistance Refugees living 5 years or less in Norway..........................................................................................................
Refugees living more than 5 years in Norway..........................................................................................................
Divorced/separated 16-59 years..........................................................................................................
Unemployed 16-59 years..........................................................................................................
Number of poor...........................................................................................................
Disablement pensioners 18-49 years of age..........................................................................................................
Child protection Population less than 16 years of age..........................................................................................................
Children less than 16 years w/ single provider...........................................................................................................
Poor children less than 16 years of age..........................................................................................................
Long-term care Population less than 67 years of age..........................................................................................................
Population 67-79 years of age..........................................................................................................
Population 80-89 years of age ..........................................................................................................
Population more than 89 years of age...........................................................................................................
Mentally disabled over 16 years w/o grant..........................................................................................................
Mentally disabled 16 years and above w/ grant...........................................................................................................
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district...........................................................................................................
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................
Culture Constant term...........................................................................................................
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................
Municipal roads Constant term...........................................................................................................
Amount of snowfall..........................................................................................................
Kilometers of municipal road..........................................................................................................
Water/sanitation Constant term...........................................................................................................
Capacity of advanced purification..........................................................................................................
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................
Other infrastr. Constant term...........................................................................................................
Inverse population size ..........................................................................................................
The bands indicate which years the variable is included in the model. The black dots indicate structural breaks. 
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These extended specifications are used whenever the models are estimated over the full 
range of the panel data (1974-2008).  
Outliers 
In order to obtain relevant parameter estimates we want to exclude outliers from the 
estimation. Some municipalities have extreme variable values in one or more years. 
This can either be due to some special characteristics or to artifacts in the dataset. 
Failure to remove important outliers may result in distorted parameter estimates.  We 
use an outlier definition that expands on that of Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), 
Pedersen (2008), Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge (2010) and Kerimova (2011). All 
observations of Oslo are omitted when estimating because of its double status as both 
municipality and county. Such a status makes it difficult to identify which expenditures 
are associated to either municipality or county services. Some municipalities with traits 
such as being unusually rich, small or have large expenditures in some sector are also 
removed from all estimation. In addition, we remove municipalities with negative 
reported sector expenditures, huge budget deficits or surpluses, and abnormal real 
income growth or decline.  
An overview of the outliers is included in appendix B 
7.1 Modeling time heterogeneity 
Estimating the model with multiplicative time dummies (model 1) is challenging in a 
number of ways. An obvious problem is that of computational costs. Expanding the 
panel by one year adds twelve new coefficients to be estimated, and the full data set 
requires more than 400 time dummies. This results in a curse of dimensionality where 
computation time grows exponentially with the time dimension.  Another problem is 
identification. Without further restricting the base model, specifically the constant 
terms, some of the equations might lose identification when adding time dummies. It 
will also be difficult to know exactly what effects the time dummies are picking up. We 
can of cause rationalize that they at least contains real growth and sector prioritizations, 
but they will in practice not be exactly the same as the sector expenditure indices. This 
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is also what we observe when estimating model 1.9 Some of the sectors show time 
effects that are comparable with the sector specific relative expenditure indices 
itS , but 
a few are either very large or very small. Such exaggerated time effects should influence 
the other parameter estimates of the model as well. In a single equation type model the 
large time interaction coefficients would lead to underestimation of the other 
parameters, and the converse for small time effects. Since we have multiple equations 
that are estimated simultaneously the effect on the parameter estimates will be more 
ambiguous. Still, it is obvious that the two methods used to handle the time 
heterogeneity in the panel data models is picking up much of the same variations.10 
All in all, the method of removing the time heterogeneity with the sector expenditure 
index seems to produce estimates that are comparable to those we get with 
multiplicative time dummies. In addition we also get more degrees of freedom, easier 
computation and need fewer restrictions on the model specifications to ensure 
identification. This will allow us to estimate more advanced model specifications such 
as the dynamic models.  
7.2 Discussion of parameter estimates 
The following discussions will concentrate on the three models that use the sector 
expenditure deflators to handle time heterogeneity. These models will be estimated over 
the full panel with the extended specifications described in the start of the chapter. Each 
model is estimated with the same excluded outliers. The estimation procedure of all 
models produced approximately normal errors in each sector.  The adjusted R
2
 of model 
2 shown in table 7.3 indicate that the model explain the variation of most sectors well. 
While the explanatory power of the other education sector and the infrastructure sectors 
are the not that high. These sectors generally contain several different services, and 
although the variables in these sectors explain some of the expenditure well they do not 
explain all the variation. 
                                                 
9
 See appendix C 
10
 See appendix D 
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Table 7.3. Adjusted R-squared 
Expenditure sector equation Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Administration sector..........................................................................................................0,856 0,927 0,934
Primary school sector..........................................................................................................0,740 0,953 0,954
Other education sector..........................................................................................................0,490 0,759 0,762
Child care sector..........................................................................................................0,854 0,968 0,969
Health care sector..........................................................................................................0,569 0,824 0,824
Social assistance sector..........................................................................................................0,605 0,860 0,861
Child protection sector..........................................................................................................0,634 0,836 0,836
Care for the elderly and disabled sector..........................................................................................................0,933 0,974 0,977
Culture sector..........................................................................................................0,627 0,871 0,872
Municipal roads sector..........................................................................................................0,337 0,622 0,622
Water supply and sanitation sector..........................................................................................................0,544 0,860 0,862
Other infrastructure sector..........................................................................................................0,466 0,791 0,795
Log liklihood -178436 -93634 -91003,5
 
The high R
2
 reported by the dynamic models are mostly a consequence of the use of a 
lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable. 
7.2.1 Marginal effects on the minimum required expenditures 
A detailed description of the factors contributing to minimum required expenditure of 
each sector in their cross-section analysis on each of the years 2000 to 2008 can be 
found in Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge (2010).  Kerimova (2011) also has a similar 
description. 
Throughout the sectors, we observe somewhat large or inflated11  parameter estimates in 
the two dynamic models. This effect will be the discussed in a later chapter, so the 
comments here will mainly be on the parameter estimates of the static model. 
The administration sector expenditure includes costs related to political governance, 
control organs and other administration services. A certain minimum level of 
administration services must be maintained even in small municipalities. Then the cost 
pro capita should be higher in small municipalities than in larger ones. The inverse 
population size criterion is defined as 1000 divided by population. This means that the 
parameter estimate of this variable can be given the interpretation of millions of kroner 
in fixed sector costs. Or put differently, there are economies of scale in the sector.  
                                                 
11
 Inflated meaning larger absolute values. 
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Table 7.4. Administration sector 
Effect on minimum required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant term..........................................................................................................2,04 2,41 2,42
(61,32) (22,91) (19,79)
Constant term (change in 2001)..........................................................................................................0,28 1,23 1,24
(9,22) (11,52) (9,85)
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................4,53 5,92 5,45
(114,73) (39,68) (38,35)
Inverse population size (change in 2001)..........................................................................................................1,01 0,90 1,19
(22,64) (5,49) (7,65)
T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK
 
That the municipality administration has large fixed costs is plausible. All the models 
estimate the fixed costs to be fairly large. The structural breaks should pick up an 
increase in administration costs in 2001 due to the change in accounting practices. 
 
The primary school sector covers the children school and the youth school. Pupils in 
both schools levels influence sector expenditures since they increase the number of 
school spots that the municipalities must supply pro capita. The effect of children school 
population on the expenditure increases with the implementation of the school reform in 
1997. Inverse population size is thought to pick up the economies of scale present in the 
sector due to small class sizes and small schools. The decrease in fixed costs in 2001 is 
assumed to pick up a transfer of administration costs to the administration sector due to 
the changed accounting regime. 
 Table 7.5. Primary school sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Population in elementary school age..........................................................................................................36,91 59,82 58,79
(37,29) (29,24) (27,52)
Population in elementary school age (change in 1997)..........................................................................................................2,81 9,24 8,78
(6,79) (11,00) (9,15)
Population 13-15 years of age..........................................................................................................96,43 54,10 58,47
(51,85) (14,34) (15,02)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district..........................................................................................................1,15 1,43 1,33
(94,59) (50,31) (43,57)
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................3,55 4,74 4,39
(73,52) (54,51) (47,07)
Inverse population size (change in 2001)..........................................................................................................-1,01 -2,28 -1,89
(19,76) (23,15) (17,86)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
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In model 2 the cost of pupils in youth school are much higher than that of a pupil in 
children school, but this difference is evened out in the two dynamic models. 
 
The other education sector is made up from the expenditures of special schools, adult 
education, before and after school programs and music schools. Children in primary 
school age are assumed to influence the cost in most of these groups. Children with 
providers working full time are assumed to be more in need of services like after school 
programs. This effect is only included after 1990, which is when such programs started 
to become a common municipality service. Language training and other integration 
initiatives for refugees is assumed to influence the cost of adult education.  
Table 7.6. Other education sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant term (after 2000)..........................................................................................................-0,33 -1,00 -1,05
(23,10) (25,86) (23,13)
Population in primary school age..........................................................................................................4,60 6,07 5,93
(32,63) (13,85) (12,34)
Children in child care age with full time working providers (after 1990)..........................................................................................................7,91 11,43 12,04
(24,34) (11,37) (11,01)
Refugees living 5 years or less in Norway (after 1986)..........................................................................................................19,83 29,59 26,91
(27,03) (10,64) (9,43)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
These parameter estimates all seem reasonable. Compared to the static model, the 
parameter estimates of the dynamic models are a little inflated. The constant term is 
included to pick up that more of the administration costs were transferred to the 
administration sector with the change in accounting practices in 2001. 
 
The child care sector expenditure is influenced by children in child care age as well as 
groups of children with special needs. Such children are those with full time working 
providers or with a single provider. The coefficients of population in childcare age and 
children with providers working full time has been estimated over several segments. 
This is to facilitate a change in their relative explanatory values within the sector as 
child care has transitioned from a service for those with special needs to a general 
service. 
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Table 7.7. Child care sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Population in child care age (1983-1990)..........................................................................................................2,87 5,57 6,66
(1,32) (1,20) (1,30)
Population in child care age (1991-1995)..........................................................................................................18,46 41,65 41,04
(31,26) (31,55) (27,70)
Population in child care age (1996-2000)..........................................................................................................27,60 39,47 38,36
(48,50) (29,94) (25,96)
Population in child care age (2001-2005)..........................................................................................................39,23 68,55 67,79
(71,33) (57,30) (51,30)
Population in child care age (after 2005)..........................................................................................................45,29 85,79 86,24
(78,75) (68,08) (62,74)
Children in child care age with full t ime working providers (1974-1982)..........................................................................................................136,87 275,53 257,78
(8,44) (6,77) (5,62)
Children in child care age with full t ime working providers (1983-1990)..........................................................................................................101,75 222,33 213,43
(11,67) (11,79) (10,34)
Children in child care age with full t ime working providers (after 1990)..........................................................................................................56,86 48,70 49,75
(42,44) (16,24) (15,57)
Children in child care age with single provider..........................................................................................................10,53 26,64 22,85
(4,94) (5,87) (4,84)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
The parameter estimates of the static model seems sensible compared to those of model 
1 and 2 estimated on shorter intervals, but the dynamic parameter estimates seems 
particularly inflated in this sector. 
 
The health care sector mostly consists of the municipality health care service 
expenditures, but also covers some preventive programs. Distance to the center of the 
municipal sub-district explains extra costs associated with travel distance, while inverse 
population size explains costs of not being able to exploit economies of scale. For 
instance, some small municipalities need to compensate physicians for the small patient 
base. Small municipalities also need a certain minimum level of emergency care staff 
ready or on call. This will result in higher pro capita costs than in bigger municipalities 
which we can see in the inverse population criterion. 
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Table 7.8. Health care sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant term..........................................................................................................1,04 1,38 1,36
(38,36) (17,27) (15,86)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district..........................................................................................................0,29 0,38 0,39
(22,74) (9,30) (9,37)
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................1,80 2,08 2,07
(71,53) (25,63) (24,96)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
 
The social assistance sector expenditure includes the costs from a number of programs. 
Unemployed are expected to increase the costs of job market programs. Transfers to 
families with insufficient means to cover living expenses and other in-kind transfers 
should be affected by the number of poor people living in the municipality. As of 1991 
the central government has compensated the municipalities for refugees who have been 
living in the country five years or less, since these are thought to use a disproportionally 
more of social services. Refugees who have been living in the country more than five 
years are also thought to increase the costs of social assistance services in the 
municipalities as discussed in NOU (1996:1). Disablement pensioners and 
divorced/separated are also expected to contribute to the social assistance expenditures 
since they often are the beneficiaries of the in-kind transfers in this sector. A structural 
change has been added to divorced/separated as it is believed that this group was more 
vulnerable and less often employed before 1991, and thus explained relatively more of 
the sector expenditures. 
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Table 7.9. Social assistance sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Refugees living 5 years or less in Norway (from 1991)..........................................................................................................23,61 26,20 25,11
(49,05) (18,95) (17,79)
Refugees living more than 5 years in Norway (from 1991)..........................................................................................................15,58 15,87 15,26
(13,62) (4,22) (3,93)
Divorced/separated 16-59 years..........................................................................................................16,66 36,11 36,34
(35,14) (26,71) (25,36)
Divorced/separated 16-59 years (change 1991)..........................................................................................................-7,80 -27,71 -27,94
(24,57) (28,88) (26,75)
Unemployed 16-59 years..........................................................................................................3,52 3,74 4,31
(8,79) (3,08) (3,32)
Number of poor..........................................................................................................8,05 8,13 8,14
(31,46) (10,98) (10,61)
Disablement pensioners 18-49 years of age..........................................................................................................7,53 9,63 8,92
(10,48) (4,63) (4,09)
T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
Except for the effect from divorced/separated being high prior to 1991 these parameter 
estimates are sensible for all models. 
 
The child protection sector has the operational responsibility of monitoring and 
preventing child abuse. The sector also administrates programs supporting and relieving 
at-risk families. The number of children in the municipality explains some of the 
variation in child protection expenditures. Serious child neglect often originates from 
social and economic problems, which can be indicated by children with a single 
provider and children from poor families. 
Table 7.10. Child protection sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Population less than 16 years of age..........................................................................................................1,84 2,17 1,99
(27,72) (10,30) (8,97)
Children less than 16 years of age with single provider..........................................................................................................19,19 23,61 23,41
(42,13) (16,83) (16,00)
Poor children less than 16 years of age..........................................................................................................3,95 9,80 11,49
(7,03) (4,96) (5,65)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
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The long-term care sector expenditures cover the operation of nursing homes, home 
care and ambulant nurses for the elderly and facilitated living for the disabled. The 
elderly are divided into different age groups since they often have needs that differ 
greatly, which mean they influence the minimum required costs differently. The 
disabled are included as of 1991 when the reform requiring municipalities to provide 
them with facilitated living arrangements was introduced. The distance to municipality 
sub-district center criteria pick up travel distance costs associated with home care and 
ambulant nurses, while the inverse population size describe costs from unutilized 
economies of scale.  
Table 7.11. Long-term care sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Population less than 67 years of age..........................................................................................................3,46 4,53 4,64
(30,17) (14,21) (13,60)
Population 67-79 years of age..........................................................................................................29,14 50,09 40,66
(26,31) (16,05) (12,79)
Population 80-89 years of age (1974-1987)..........................................................................................................78,78 84,38 177,04
(12,95) (4,45) (8,01)
Population 80-89 years of age (1988-1990)..........................................................................................................112,54 286,11 322,81
(30,84) (30,33) (32,49)
Population 80-89 years of age (after 1990)..........................................................................................................78,26 39,71 64,16
(32,76) (5,46) (9,29)
Population more than 89 years of age..........................................................................................................198,40 243,36 206,05
(26,41) (10,22) (9,38)
Mentally disabled 16 years and above without grant (from 1991)..........................................................................................................289,51 382,88 393,22
(38,41) (15,03) (17,71)
Mentally disabled 16 years and above with grant (from 1991)..........................................................................................................876,33 902,64 884,68
(137,70) (34,41) (37,55)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district..........................................................................................................0,81 1,03 0,80
(25,39) (11,45) (9,31)
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................4,35 4,44 4,28
(68,73) (25,47) (24,50)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
The cost of population with age between 80-89 years old has several structural breaks. 
A break is added in 1988 to capture the increased costs of the elderly care reform. Then 
one in 1991, both since this group is expected to become less costly as population 
becomes healthier and because of the change in accounting practices. The parameter 
estimates from the static model seems to be sensible, but for some variables the 
dynamic models provide very large estimates. 
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The culture sector expenditures cover costs associated with cinemas, libraries, 
museums, sports, arts and religious purposes. The inverse population size criterion is the 
only included variable contributing to the minimum required expenditure. Until its 
inclusion in the block grant system in 1986 small municipalities got larger earmarked 
grants for culture purposes than other municipalities.  
Table 7.12. Culture sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant term..........................................................................................................1,02 1,31 1,27
(82,84) (42,84) (37,03)
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................0,41 0,45 0,42
(31,43) (12,67) (11,30)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
The municipal roads sector expenditures include the costs of building and maintaining 
roads, as well as road safety work. The total length of municipal roads and amount of 
snowfall has been shown to increase the minimum required expenditures of roads. 
These factors should explain maintenance and snow removal costs.  
Table 7.13. Municipal roads sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant term..........................................................................................................0,18 0,20 0,18
(17,60) (5,53) (4,75)
Amount of snowfall..........................................................................................................0,04 0,07 0,07
(17,22) (8,35) (8,10)
Kilometers of municipal road..........................................................................................................21,79 21,04 20,76
(57,45) (14,96) (14,25)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
The water supply and sanitation sector cover the costs of supplying water to the 
households in the municipality, as well as connecting them to a sewer system with 
purification plant. Advanced purification is obviously more expensive than simpler 
purification techniques. Expenditures in this sector have been found to increase with 
capacity of advanced purification, which is either biological purification, chemical 
purification or both. There are probably some fixed operational costs of running 
purification plants since they need to be staffed. We find that economies of scale are 
present in this sector as indicated by the inverse population size criterion.  
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Table 7.14. Water supply and sanitation sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant term..........................................................................................................1,18 1,40 1,40
(91,31) (51,94) (46,18)
Capacity of advanced purification..........................................................................................................0,47 0,54 0,52
(40,03) (17,12) (14,92)
Inverse population size..........................................................................................................0,44 0,52 0,50
(28,75) (16,49) (15,14)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
 
The other infrastructure sector consists of residential and commercial infrastructure, 
area planning and building services and, environment and waste management and fire 
and rescue services. The provision of many small services will naturally lead to 
economies of scale. The inverse population size criteria indicate the cost of not utilizing 
this effect. Municipal commercial activities were recorded in this sector to a much 
higher degree prior to the change in accounting practices in 1991 than after. This is why 
we do not include the effect of inverse population size in that period.  
Table 7.15. Other infrastructure sector 
Effect on minimun required expenditure Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant term..........................................................................................................0,77 1,30 1,16
(24,60) (17,67) (13,44)
Inverse population size (from 1991)..........................................................................................................2,11 1,91 1,64
(28,79) (11,72) (9,16)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
Overall, the three models produce parameter estimates which are in line with the costs 
we expect for the different groups. The static model produce estimates that are 
comparable with those of the two static models estimated on shorter intervals12 in 7.1. 
and also with those of earlier versions of KOMMODE such as Langørgen, Pedersen and 
Aaberge (2010) and Kerimova (2010)  The dynamic models also produce parameter 
estimates that often are comparable to those of the static model, although some of the 
parameters seem inflated.13 This results in somewhat larger minimum required 
expenditures.14 We will discuss the dynamic models more in chapter 7.3. 
                                                 
12
 See appendix C 
13
 Inflated meaning larger absolute values. 
14
 See appendix E 
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7.2.2 Marginal budget shares 
Municipalities can freely allocate the remaining income after total minimum required 
expenditure is covered. This allocation is assumed to be influenced by three taste 
variables. The socialist share in local government council, average education and share 
living in densely populated areas. 
Table 7.16 show that the socialist share in the local council is found to increase the 
municipal use of the disposable income in the administration sector, primary school, 
other education, child care, health care, child protection, long-term care and culture 
sectors. Of these, the long-term care sector, administration sector and primary school 
sector are particularly large, which are plausible focus areas for socialist parties.  The 
only sectors that are affected significantly negative are other infrastructure sector and 
the net operating surplus. One possible reason for this may be that other infrastructure 
sector contains municipality owned/run businesses and other commercial activity. The 
socialist share also seems to strongly reduce the share of disposable income used in the 
net operating surplus sector. 
Table 7.16. Effect of sosialist share in local council on marginal budget share by sector 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Administration............................................................................................................0,12 0,12 0,07
(9,58) (9,58) (6,13)
Primary school............................................................................................................0,13 0,13 0,08
(11,34) (11,34) (7,25)
Other education............................................................................................................0,03 0,03 0,03
(4,36) (4,36) (4,18)
Child Care............................................................................................................0,05 0,05 0,04
(10,18) (10,18) (8,61)
Health care............................................................................................................0,06 0,06 0,05
(5,57) (5,57) (5,06)
Social assistance............................................................................................................0,01 0,01 0,01
(1,67) (1,67) (1,90)
Child protection............................................................................................................0,02 0,02 0,02
(4,20) (4,20) (4,29)
Care for the elderly and disabled............................................................................................................0,19 0,19 0,12
(9,01) (9,01) (6,01)
Culture............................................................................................................0,05 0,05 0,04
(8,92) (8,92) (7,68)
Municipal roads............................................................................................................-0,01 -0,01 -0,01
(0,90) (0,90) (1,02)
Water supply and sanitation............................................................................................................0,01 0,01 0,00
(0,86) (0,86) (0,52)
Other infrastructure............................................................................................................-0,14 -0,14 -0,12
(6,51) (6,51) (5,80)
Net operating surplus............................................................................................................-0,34 -0,45 -0,34
T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
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The average share of socialists in the local council has varied between 40 and 45 
percent up until 1996 when it fell to 37 percent. It was at a low point in 2000 with 36 
percent but recovered somewhat to 39 percent in 2004. 
The share of inhabitants living in densely populated areas increase the marginal share of 
disposable income used in social assistance, culture, water supply and sanitation and 
other infrastructure sectors as shown in table 7.17. The administration sector, primary 
education sector, care for the elderly and disabled sector and child care sector is found 
to be down prioritized in urban municipalities. Dense settlement also increase the net 
operating surplus. 
Table 7.17. Effect of urban settlement on marginal budget share by sector 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Administration............................................................................................................-0,07 -0,07 -0,07
(9,56) (9,56) (10,38)
Primary school............................................................................................................-0,07 -0,07 -0,07
(11,63) (11,63) (11,34)
Other education............................................................................................................0,01 0,01 0,01
(1,34) (1,34) (1,45)
Child Care............................................................................................................-0,02 -0,02 -0,01
(6,07) (6,07) (5,25)
Health care............................................................................................................0,00 0,00 0,00
(0,56) (0,56) (0,24)
Social assistance............................................................................................................0,02 0,02 0,02
(5,26) (5,26) (5,28)
Child protection............................................................................................................0,00 0,00 0,00
(0,52) (0,52) (0,46)
Care for the elderly and disabled............................................................................................................-0,10 -0,10 -0,07
(9,02) (9,02) (6,86)
Culture............................................................................................................0,01 0,01 0,02
(4,32) (4,32) (5,16)
Municipal roads............................................................................................................0,00 0,00 0,00
(1,17) (1,17) (1,08)
Water supply and sanitation............................................................................................................0,03 0,03 0,03
(9,44) (9,44) (9,24)
Other infrastructure............................................................................................................0,09 0,09 0,08
(7,70) (7,70) (6,98)
Net operating surplus............................................................................................................0,03 0,07 0,08
T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
The share of people living in densely populated areas has increased throughout the 
estimation period. From a share close to 41 percent in 1974 to 51 percent in 2008. 
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Average education level positively influence the marginal budget share of the 
administration, primary school, child care, health care, social assistance, child 
protection, long-term care, culture and water supply and sanitation sectors. The primary 
school sector and long-term care are the sectors most prioritized by higher average 
education.Educated people will probably value education and the administration sector 
often employs highly educated people. Both of which can explain the positive increase 
in the primary school and the administration sector. The only negative effect is on net 
operating surplus. 
Table 7.18. Effect of average education on marginal budget share by sector 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Administration............................................................................................................0,03 0,03 0,02
(7,13) (7,13) (5,33)
Primary school............................................................................................................0,04 0,04 0,03
(11,16) (11,16) (8,17)
Other education............................................................................................................0,00 0,00 0,00
(1,06) (1,06) (0,87)
Child Care............................................................................................................0,02 0,02 0,01
(10,09) (10,09) (8,91)
Health care............................................................................................................0,02 0,02 0,02
(5,63) (5,63) (5,25)
Social assistance............................................................................................................0,02 0,02 0,02
(8,49) (8,49) (8,35)
Child protection............................................................................................................0,01 0,01 0,01
(8,97) (8,97) (8,64)
Care for the elderly and disabled............................................................................................................0,04 0,04 0,03
(5,24) (5,24) (4,96)
Culture............................................................................................................0,03 0,03 0,03
(16,78) (16,78) (15,47)
Municipal roads............................................................................................................0,00 0,00 0,00
(2,29) (2,29) (2,07)
Water supply and sanitation............................................................................................................0,02 0,02 0,02
(12,47) (12,47) (11,67)
Other infrastructure............................................................................................................0,00 0,00 -0,01
(0,04) (0,04) (1,30)
Net operating surplus............................................................................................................-0,18 -0,20 -0,18
T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
The average education has been steadily increasing. From an average of 0.88 extra years 
of schooling in excess of 9 years in 1974, to 2.78 years in 2008. 
Across all three models we find similar effects on the marginal budget shares. We also 
find that most effects match earlier results in Langørgen, Pedersen and Aaberge (2010) 
and Kerimova (2011). Some notable differences are that they found negative effects 
from average education on the administration sector and the primary school sector, 
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which is the opposite of the results presented here.15 The strong time trend in both the 
average education variable and the urban settlement variable may cause problems since 
they are likely to be spuriously correlated with other variables that have time trends. 
One possible solution is to instead transform these variables to deviations from yearly 
mean.   
7.3 Dynamic effects 
An important reason for creating a dynamic model is to observe relationships that are 
hidden in a cross-section model. The most important dynamic relation in a partial 
adjustment model is the adjustment speed. Most municipal services are labor intensive. 
Strong worker rights means that employees rarely are fired, so shifting resources around 
in municipal service sectors usually mean hiring or relocating (Langørgen et al. (2010)). 
Such processes can be slow and expensive depending on external factors such as the 
business cycle or other municipal characteristics. We will analyze the results from 
different specifications of a heterogeneous adjustment speed and compare the results 
with earlier research. It will also be important to analyze the net operating surplus sector 
which has a quasi-dynamic form. 
7.3.1 Net operating surplus sector 
In the net operating surplus sector it is not meaningful to talk about the minimum 
required expenditure in the same sense as in the other sectors. The marginal share of 
disposable income, the allocation of income growth, minimum required expenditure and 
net operating surplus from last period should all be considered together. Equation (7.1) 
describes the identity relation of the net operating sector.16 
    0 0 0 0, 1 0 1( ) 1 ( )t t t t t t tu y u y y                (7.1) 
   
If we take a look at the parameter estimates from the minimum required net operating 
surplus sector equation (6.9) we recognize the strict budgetary rules described in 5.3. 
                                                 
15
 The negative effect on primary education is not significant for all the the years in in Langørgen, Pedersen and 
Aaberge (2010) 
16
 Sector 0 is the net operating surplus. 
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Budget deficits in previous years lead to a strengthening of the budgetary balance in the 
current year.  
Table 7.19. Net operating surplus sector 
Model 3 Model 4
Constant term......................................................................................................................-2,11 -2,30
(14,09) (12,92)
Negative budget balance 1 year ago..................................................................................................-0,60 -0,66
(8,19) (10,14)
Negative budget balance 1 year ago (change 2001)..................................................................................................-0,32 -0,27
(3,82) (3,39)
Negative budget balance 2 years ago..................................................................................................-0,57 -0,70
(2,68) (3,45)
Negative budget balance 2 years ago (change 2001)..................................................................................................-0,34 -0,09
(1,31) (0,33)
T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
As can be seen in table 7.19. the revision of the budget rules in 2001 lead to a further 
strengthening of the response after deficits. 
The marginal budget share of the municipalities also contributes to this sector. The 
average marginal share for the net operating surplus over all units and time periods is 
more than 25 percent of discretionary income. This marginal share has a downward 
trend due to the negative influence from average education (see table 7.18), which is 
steadily increasing over time. 
Real income growth of the municipalities would lead to an overestimate of the 
adjustment speed if unaccounted for.  To control for this and to satisfy the budget 
constraint we added the deltas in (6.5). Sectors with significantly positive deltas can be 
interpreted as being used as budget balancing items. Such sectors expenditures are more 
easily reduced if the budget needs tightening and increased when extra funds are 
available. 
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Table 7.20. Allocation of real income growth  
Model 3 Model 4
Administration............................................................................................................-0,01 0,00
(4,54) (3,39)
Primary school............................................................................................................0,00 0,00
(3,88) (2,99)
Other education............................................................................................................0,00 0,00
(1,50) (1,22)
Child Care............................................................................................................0,00 0,00
(2,03) (2,64)
Health care............................................................................................................0,01 0,01
(6,00) (6,49)
Social assistance............................................................................................................0,00 0,00
(2,55) (2,77)
Child protection............................................................................................................0,00 0,00
(1,46) (1,09)
Long-term care............................................................................................................0,03 0,02
(17,44) (11,60)
Culture............................................................................................................ 0,00 0,00
(2,45) (2,56)
Municipal roads............................................................................................................0,00 0,00
(5,13) (5,04)
Water supply and sanitation............................................................................................................0,00 0,00
(1,83) (1,93)
Other infrastructure............................................................................................................0,09 0,09
(56,07) (55,28)
Net operating surplus............................................................................................................0,87 0,88
 T-values reported in parenthesis. Coefficients represent shares of total real income growth. 
The two models produce pretty similar estimates of the deltas. Aside from the net 
operating surplus only the health care sector, long-term care sector and other 
infrastructure sector has significant positive results. While the first two effects are very 
small, other infrastructure has a somewhat larger delta of 0.09. By estimating the 
dynamic models on different time segments, the delta for other infrastructure sector 
seems to be high throughout the period. This sector consists of many smaller services, 
often of a monitoring or preparedness type. Cutting costs in such services may prove 
politically easier than other services that impact the welfare of the citizens more 
directly. 
Since (6.7) holds, this means that the share of real income growth that is distributed into 
the net operating surplus sector is 0.87 in model 3 and 0.88 in model 4. These results 
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simply explain that most of real growth in municipal income, positive or negative, 
directly impacts the net operating surplus sector. 
7.3.2 Heterogeneous adjustment speed 
The starting point for further analysis is to examine the estimate of the constant 
adjustment speed of the two dynamic models. While many of the parameters estimates 
seem to differ between the two models, the adjustment speed estimates do not diverge 
that much. By only estimating the constant term of (6.12) we get 0.209 in model 3 and 
0.206 in model 4. 
Now we want to see how the results of this model holds up to Borge and Rattsø (1995). 
They found that small municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants responded 
significantly faster than larger municipalities to exogenous changes. The following 
discussion will concentrate on the parameter estimates of model 3. 
Table 7.21. Effects on adjustment speed  
Model 3 Model 4
Adjustment speed............................................................................................................0,194 0,190
(180,20) (176,18)
Change in adjustment speed (population<5000)............................................................................................................0,022 0,022
(19,91) (19,75)  
We find the adjustment speed to be 0.194 for large municipalities and 0.216 for small 
municipalities, meaning that small municipalities adjust faster. This effect has the same 
direction as found by Borge and Rattsø (1995). They found average adjustment speeds 
of 0.10 for large and 0.14 for small municipalities, but they used an entirely different 
model setup so the effects are not directly comparable. However, when estimating the 
models over the same time span (1984-1987) as used by Borge and Rattsø (1995) the 
results are much closer. More precisely we get an adjustment speed of 0.127 for the 
large and 0.162 for the small municipalities.  
Since we have a large panel data set we can model more complicated relationships. One 
apparent extension is to allow the adjustment speed to change over time. By replacing 
the constant term with three different constants for the time segments 1974-1990, 1991-
2000 and 2001-2008 we also avoid any problems caused by different accounting 
regimes. 
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Table 7.22. Effects on adjustment speed  
Model 3 Model 4
Adjustment speed (1974-1990)............................................................................................................0,170 0,166
(144,80) (141,11)
Adjustment speed (1991-2000)............................................................................................................0,192 0,190
(143,83) (142,13)
Adjustment speed (after 2000)............................................................................................................0,237 0,228
(169,80) (163,03)
Change in adjustment speed (population<5000)............................................................................................................0,022 0,022
(19,85) (19,65)  
The adjustment speed is clearly increasing over time. Municipalities adjust on average 
6.7 percent more towards equilibrium after 2000 than before 1991, and 4.5 percent more 
than between 1991 and 2000. Large municipalities continue to be more sluggish in their 
reallocation response.   
Municipality size is clearly an important factor for explaining reallocation dynamics. 
The influence of size can be made more nuanced by subdividing municipalities into 
finer size categories. These groups are; smaller than 2000 inhabitants; between 2000 
and 5000 inhabitants; between 5000 and 20000 inhabitants; leaving municipalities with 
a population of more than 20000 as the base group.  
Table 7.23. Effects on adjustment speed  
Model 3 Model 4
Adjustment speed (1974-1990)............................................................................................................0,161 0,158
(48,77) (46,20)
Adjustment speed (1991-2000)............................................................................................................0,184 0,181
(54,99) (52,76)
Adjustment speed (after 2000)............................................................................................................0,228 0,219
(67,94) (63,18)
Change in adjustment speed (tiny; population<2000)............................................................................................................0,046 0,044
(13,78) (12,90)
Change in adjustment speed (small; 2000 < population < 5000)............................................................................................................0,020 0,021
(5,94) (6,08)
Change in adjustment speed (medium; 5000 < population < 20000)............................................................................................................0,008 0,007
(2,28) (2,12)  
These parameter estimates confirms the results commented above. Average adjustment 
speed increase over time, and small municipalities adjust faster than larger ones. But 
what is shown here is that the size trend is pervasive through the different groups. Large 
municipalities on average exhibit stronger inertia than medium sized municipalities, 
which in turn are slower than small municipalities. Municipalities with less than 2000 
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inhabitants have the highest adjustment speed where 4.6 percent more of the desired 
change in allocation is implemented in the first year than in the base group.     
Some suggested reasons for this finding can be that larger municipalities have 
organizational structures that are more complex than smaller ones. Longer chains of 
command can create a delay between an observed change and the decision to adjust. 
7.3.3 Dynamic bias 
As mentioned earlier the estimated adjustment speed parameters in the dynamic models 
did not diverge much. Model 3 had an adjustment speed that was 0.3 percent higher 
than that of model 4. While the difference is statistically significant, it is of no economic 
significance. But this still runs counter to our expectations given the results from 
chapter 3.2.1. Table 7.24 shows that the estimated parameters in the error terms (6.14) 
of model 4 are positive for all sectors. Positive autocorrelation coefficients in the error 
term and positive adjustment speed should have resulted in an asymptotic negative bias 
in the adjustment speed estimate produced by model 3. This is the opposite of what we 
observe.  
Table 7.24 Autocorrelation coefficient in error term of model 4  
Administration........................................................................................................................0,31
(96,60)
Primary school........................................................................................................................0,17
(35,67)
Other education........................................................................................................................0,11
(19,62)
Child Care........................................................................................................................0,14
(22,84)
Health care........................................................................................................................0,08
(15,78)
Social assistance........................................................................................................................0,09
(13,72)
Child protection........................................................................................................................0,06
(12,89)
Care for the elderly and disabled........................................................................................................................0,38
(88,12)
Culture........................................................................................................................0,08
(12,63)
Municipal roads........................................................................................................................0,05
(9,68)
Water supply and sanitation........................................................................................................................0,09
(12,72)
Other infrastructure........................................................................................................................0,14
(30,95)  
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We observe almost systematically larger absolute parameter estimates in the dynamic 
model versions than in the static. This ―inflation effect‖ is strong in some sectors and 
hardly present in some. This discrepancy between the dynamic and static estimates was 
not expected, and we will discuss a few of the inquiries that have been made to uncover 
the reason for it. 
This could be a result of multicorrelation between the explanatory variables and the 
lagged dependent variable, which would explain why the effect is different across the 
sectors. If indeed the equilibrium parameter estimates are overestimated, then the 
adjustment speed will be underestimated. By fixing the adjustment speed parameter to 
0.3  , 0.5   and 0.9  we find that the parameter values of model 3 gradually 
approaches those of model 2. If the inflation effect was due to multicorrelation we could 
expect the parameter estimates to approach expected values when the adjustment speed 
parameter was set a little higher.  
The partial adjustment model estimated by Kerimova (2011) on the years 2001-2008 
also seems to suffer from the same problem. Compared to the other models the 
parameters estimates of the other models are inflated. We have also estimated the 
models on shorter time segments, and the effect is still there.  
A robustness analysis has been performed by running five estimations where either 50 
percent, 75 percent or 90 percent of the observations were randomly removed. We find 
the parameter estimates of model 3 to be stable in all the 15 estimations, even with only 
10% of the original observations. 
Numerous other approaches and misspecification tests17 has been applied in order to 
uncover the cause of the discrepancy, but none has been found. We leave this issue to be 
investigated by future studies in this topic.  
 
                                                 
17
 Local FIML optima, alternative error specifications, sector specific adjustment speed coefficients and various 
structural breaks. 
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8 Concluding Remarks 
Comparisons between short period versions of the two static models using either time 
dummies or sector specific expenditure deflators to handle time heterogeneity suggest 
that the latter method has certain favorable attributes. Other than producing reasonable 
parameter estimates, it is also less computationally costly than the time dummy 
approach as well as less likely to be having problems with identification. A model 
specification with several structural breaks is proposed to accommodate changes in the 
parameters due to institutional or social changes. Three models are estimated over the 
full period. One static model, one partial adjustment model without and one partial 
adjustment model with autocorrelated errors. The static model produces parameter 
estimates that are comparable to those obtained on shorter segments. The dynamic 
models produce estimates that can seem to be inflated compared to the static models. 
We have made many attempts to uncover the reason for this difference, but it has 
proven to be elusive.  
In our analysis of the dynamic model results we found that net operational deficits in the 
preceding years leads to a strengthening of the net operational surplus in the current 
year. This effect is strengthened further with the 2001 revision of the law of 
municipalities and the introduction of the ROBEK-list. By estimating a heterogeneous 
adjustment speed relation we found the inertia of large municipalities to be greater than 
that of smaller ones. This confirms earlier research by Borge and Rattsø (1995). 
Further research into this topic should first of all investigate the reason behind the 
discrepancy between the static and dynamic results. To solve this will certainly reveal 
interesting information about the dynamic relationships of municipal spending. More 
work should also be applied to fine tuning the model specifications and the structural 
changes, and thereby further reduce misspecification in the models. Especially some 
inquiry into an alternative setup for the marginal budget shares could prove to be 
worthwhile. Last, a natural extension of the model would be to examine the omitted 
variable bias caused by unit heterogeneity by using region fixed effects as proposed by 
Kerimova (2011). The much larger time dimension in this panel data set should produce 
better estimates on these fixed effects. 
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Appendix A: Index values 
Table A.1. Index values for sector specific expenditure and municipal consumption  
Year S100 S210 S220 S300 S400 S510 S520 S600 S700 S810 S820 S830 P
 
1972 0,033 0,071 0,039 0,002 0,042 0,044 0,012 0,013 0,043 0,134 0,038 0,169 0,116 
1973 0,038 0,077 0,042 0,002 0,047 0,051 0,014 0,015 0,048 0,141 0,041 0,190 0,126 
1974 0,043 0,086 0,052 0,003 0,056 0,057 0,017 0,018 0,054 0,152 0,049 0,216 0,143 
1975 0,053 0,102 0,063 0,005 0,082 0,060 0,019 0,022 0,067 0,183 0,060 0,254 0,161 
1976 0,060 0,119 0,072 0,008 0,105 0,060 0,026 0,029 0,081 0,218 0,070 0,300 0,181 
1977 0,070 0,134 0,088 0,011 0,083 0,063 0,029 0,030 0,101 0,254 0,085 0,348 0,199 
1978 0,080 0,150 0,098 0,016 0,087 0,079 0,031 0,035 0,121 0,290 0,100 0,396 0,217 
1979 0,087 0,158 0,102 0,020 0,098 0,090 0,036 0,040 0,135 0,284 0,116 0,424 0,224 
1980 0,096 0,176 0,117 0,025 0,069 0,103 0,036 0,042 0,198 0,307 0,134 0,455 0,244 
1981 0,114 0,197 0,131 0,033 0,089 0,082 0,042 0,051 0,233 0,334 0,151 0,503 0,270 
1982 0,132 0,224 0,145 0,041 0,108 0,104 0,050 0,059 0,266 0,361 0,174 0,584 0,300 
1983 0,150 0,243 0,161 0,050 0,100 0,146 0,053 0,070 0,302 0,397 0,194 0,670 0,323 
1984 0,165 0,259 0,178 0,057 0,171 0,187 0,066 0,077 0,332 0,400 0,214 0,744 0,344 
1985 0,183 0,283 0,187 0,064 0,221 0,215 0,071 0,086 0,362 0,443 0,237 0,836 0,365 
1986 0,208 0,295 0,194 0,075 0,239 0,262 0,088 0,099 0,396 0,470 0,268 0,934 0,395 
1987 0,252 0,328 0,227 0,096 0,263 0,351 0,103 0,115 0,451 0,551 0,299 1,002 0,437 
1988 0,275 0,346 0,266 0,117 0,290 0,446 0,109 0,234 0,472 0,535 0,326 1,077 0,462 
1989 0,291 0,360 0,294 0,138 0,315 0,508 0,113 0,247 0,486 0,518 0,350 1,085 0,481 
1990 0,297 0,371 0,316 0,160 0,340 0,550 0,131 0,264 0,511 0,531 0,377 1,132 0,494 
1991 0,367 0,378 0,441 0,186 0,367 0,538 0,183 0,346 0,612 0,582 0,394 0,495 0,508 
1992 0,388 0,386 0,519 0,212 0,392 0,569 0,232 0,365 0,634 0,581 0,416 0,546 0,516 
1993 0,390 0,390 0,590 0,239 0,421 0,599 0,265 0,376 0,661 0,583 0,432 0,606 0,522 
1994 0,413 0,400 0,666 0,257 0,438 0,632 0,273 0,391 0,676 0,622 0,458 0,635 0,532 
1995 0,437 0,411 0,725 0,275 0,454 0,672 0,292 0,417 0,697 0,638 0,497 0,643 0,552 
1996 0,441 0,436 0,778 0,299 0,484 0,672 0,317 0,446 0,720 0,634 0,527 0,619 0,571 
1997 0,462 0,477 0,833 0,310 0,512 0,631 0,337 0,470 0,745 0,661 0,570 0,598 0,590 
1998 0,498 0,559 0,934 0,323 0,566 0,610 0,367 0,519 0,783 0,674 0,602 0,647 0,622 
1999 0,489 0,605 0,956 0,341 0,612 0,636 0,396 0,567 0,829 0,712 0,680 0,648 0,644 
2000 0,472 0,658 0,988 0,366 0,662 0,684 0,433 0,615 0,865 0,736 0,711 0,631 0,677 
2001 0,818 0,711 0,693 0,389 0,695 0,698 0,610 0,601 0,719 0,782 0,791 0,678 0,724 
2002 0,670 0,761 0,780 0,439 0,754 0,793 0,670 0,671 0,759 0,798 0,829 0,675 0,758 
2003 0,824 0,813 0,812 0,494 0,784 0,868 0,706 0,698 0,784 0,791 0,842 0,697 0,798 
2004 0,805 0,821 0,836 0,552 0,787 0,855 0,750 0,732 0,796 0,786 0,881 0,762 0,821 
2005 0,793 0,850 0,851 0,617 0,806 0,919 0,800 0,754 0,806 0,808 0,887 0,806 0,845 
2006 0,842 0,898 0,884 0,739 0,854 0,942 0,849 0,826 0,876 0,911 0,941 0,834 0,883 
2007 0,936 0,951 0,938 0,860 0,917 0,935 0,920 0,900 0,944 0,979 0,925 0,895 0,928 
2008 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Administration sector (100), primary school sector (210), other education (220), child care (300), health care (400), social assistance 
(510), child protection (520), long-term care (600), culture sector (700), municipal roads sector (810), water supply and sanitation 
sector (820), other infrastructure (830). 
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Appendix B: Outlier definitions 
An observation of a municipality in time is labeled an outlier if either one the following 
conditions is satisfied. It is one of the permanent outliers, it has negative reported 
expenditures or it violates some rules restricting the allowed values of the net operating 
surplus and the real growth in income. 
Table B.1. Permanent outliers 
Excluded municipality   Reason for exclusion 
(0301) Oslo 
 
County and municipality 
(0428) Trysil 
 
Large infrastructure expenditures 
(0434) Engerdal 
 
Large other education expenditures 
(0941) Bykle 
 
Rich municipality 
(1046) Sirdal 
 
Rich municipality 
(1129) Forsand 
 
Rich municipality 
(1151) Utsira 
 
Very small municipality 
(1232) Eidfjord 
 
Rich municipality 
(1252) Modalen 
 
Small and rich municipality 
(1418) Balestrand 
 
Mix-up in municipal accounts 
(1421) Aurland 
 
Rich municipality 
(1665) Tydal 
 
Rich municipality 
(1834) Lurøy 
 
Long travel distances 
(1836) Rødøy 
 
Long travel distances 
(1911) Kvæfjord 
 
Mix-up in municipal accounts 
(2027) Nesseby 
 
Large culture expenditures 
 
 
The rules for the net operating surplus are: 
 Net operating surplus cannot be greater than 80% of the income of the 
municipality. 
 Net operating deficit cannot be larger than 20% of the income of the 
municipality. 
The rules for the real growth in income are: 
 Real income growth cannot be greater than 1
3
 of the income. 
 Real income growth cannot be less than 1
2
  of the income. 
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Table B.2. Overview of number and decomposition of outlier reason 
year Total outliers Fixed outliers 
Negative reported 
expenditures 
Large absolute net 
operating surplus 
Large absolute real 
income growth 
1972 43 15 20 6 4 
1973 36 15 15 7 0 
1974 25 15 9 1 3 
1975 47 15 26 9 7 
1976 38 15 15 7 5 
1977 50 16 30 7 2 
1978 47 16 32 4 2 
1979 52 16 33 8 2 
1980 83 16 66 4 1 
1981 73 16 58 2 3 
1982 55 16 43 1 1 
1983 44 16 30 2 0 
1984 33 16 17 1 3 
1985 31 16 15 1 2 
1986 36 16 23 0 0 
1987 30 16 14 2 0 
1988 24 16 9 2 1 
1989 20 16 5 0 0 
1990 25 16 7 0 3 
1991 19 16 2 0 3 
1992 22 16 6 1 0 
1993 21 16 3 2 3 
1994 18 16 1 0 1 
1995 19 16 4 0 0 
1996 20 16 4 1 2 
1997 27 16 11 2 2 
1998 25 16 8 1 1 
1999 26 16 12 0 0 
2000 28 16 13 0 0 
2001 20 16 5 1 1 
2002 25 16 8 4 4 
2003 24 16 6 3 5 
2004 21 16 4 1 2 
2005 23 16 8 1 1 
2006 21 16 6 1 1 
2007 26 16 5 6 1 
2008 25 16 5 7 1 
Observations may satisfy more than one reason for being labeled an outlier, so total outliers are not the sum of the outlier groups. 
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Appendix C: Parmeter estimates - short segments 
Table C.1. Parameter estimates – model 1 
Sector Time period 1974-1982 1983-1990 1991-2000 2001-2008
Budget surplus Constant term.......................................................................................-2,30 -1,47 -1,62 -1,94
( 4,99) ( 3,94) ( 10,36) ( 10,39)
Real growth in municipal income.......................................................................................1,67 0,57 0,55 0,53
( 12,09) ( 10,34) ( 32,54) ( 38,44)
Administration Constant term.......................................................................................1,08 1,37 1,38 2,00
( 34,81) ( 26,43) ( 18,89) ( 14,55)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................1,76 2,95 2,95 5,09
( 61,63) ( 65,23) ( 44,53) ( 49,65)
Primary school Population in elementary school age.......................................................................................20,69 27,37 42,54 49,92
( 14,10) ( 14,16) ( 22,19) ( 28,46)
Population 13-15 years of age.......................................................................................69,05 77,18 94,00 75,64
( 22,67) ( 21,56) ( 22,30) ( 21,25)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district.......................................................................................0,88 0,92 0,80 1,20
( 51,94) ( 48,57) ( 32,57) ( 35,02)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................3,01 2,87 1,69 2,30
( 34,97) ( 32,30) ( 18,11) ( 30,33)
Other education Population in primary school age.......................................................................................3,03 5,06 2,83 1,34
( 11,52) ( 22,72) ( 4,49) ( 3,76)
Children in child care age without full t ime working providers.......................................................................................- - 16,84 8,99
- - ( 10,94) ( 12,64)
Refugees living 5 years or less in Norway.......................................................................................- 6,94 14,35 33,66
- ( 5,25) ( 5,66) ( 25,69)
Child Care Population in child care age.......................................................................................- 2,00 6,39 39,07
- ( 2,76) ( 5,48) ( 29,20)
Children in child care age without full t ime working providers.......................................................................................31,32 36,81 59,60 78,46
( 27,62) ( 15,84) ( 16,67) ( 30,49)
Children in child care age with single provider.......................................................................................11,76 -0,02 2,84 9,03
( 9,94) ( 0,01) ( 0,71) ( 2,17)
Health care Constant term.......................................................................................0,31 0,77 1,00 0,97
( 3,42) ( 12,84) ( 15,50) ( 13,85)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district.......................................................................................0,00 0,18 0,32 0,38
( 0,12) ( 6,57) ( 13,08) ( 15,43)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................0,38 1,13 1,20 1,89
( 4,78) ( 19,73) ( 18,44) ( 37,42)
Social assistance Refugees living 5 years or less in Norway.......................................................................................- - 12,22 45,13
- - ( 12,00) ( 25,89)
Refugees living more than 5 years in Norway.......................................................................................- - 30,51 16,53
- - ( 10,46) ( 7,69)
Divorced/separated 16-59 years.......................................................................................11,95 28,01 10,20 4,40
( 16,56) ( 25,06) ( 12,06) ( 5,26)
Unemployed 16-59 years.......................................................................................0,27 -0,30 5,52 8,04
( 0,36) ( 0,24) ( 6,18) ( 5,37)
Number of poor.......................................................................................1,34 5,64 4,87 9,93
( 6,76) ( 8,73) ( 8,35) ( 12,73)
Disablement pensioners 18-49 years of age.......................................................................................0,78 5,16 11,57 7,76
( 1,26) ( 2,36) ( 8,37) ( 4,51)
Child protection Population less than 16 years of age.......................................................................................0,14 0,42 1,41 1,75
( 3,10) ( 6,29) ( 13,82) ( 6,99)
Children less than 16 years of age with single provider.......................................................................................0,78 7,70 8,79 17,02
( 1,27) ( 10,47) ( 8,30) ( 11,11)
Poor children less than 16 years of age.......................................................................................2,70 -0,54 4,36 10,42
( 4,70) ( 0,62) ( 3,54) ( 5,48)
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Long-term care Population less than 67 years of age.......................................................................................0,30 1,02 2,41 2,88
( 2,27) ( 5,06) ( 9,59) ( 8,69)
Population 67-79 years of age.......................................................................................3,12 17,81 27,21 35,28
( 2,36) ( 8,10) ( 11,00) ( 11,04)
Population 80-89 years of age.......................................................................................51,16 80,32 78,40 62,21
( 12,10) ( 11,97) ( 14,11) ( 11,34)
Population more than 89 years of age.......................................................................................38,14 100,41 182,35 233,42
( 3,07) ( 4,68) ( 9,91) ( 15,49)
Mentally disabled 16 years and above without grant.......................................................................................- - 279,19 242,61
- - ( 17,90) ( 13,21)
Mentally disabled 16 years and above with grant.......................................................................................- - 929,79 772,02
- - ( 68,72) ( 34,64)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district.......................................................................................0,08 0,33 0,42 1,11
( 2,67) ( 6,16) ( 6,41) ( 15,13)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................1,27 3,84 3,13 2,67
( 19,55) ( 35,10) ( 18,71) ( 15,70)
Culture Constant term.......................................................................................0,93 1,02 1,10 0,84
( 30,61) ( 18,99) ( 16,69) ( 12,51)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................0,31 0,14 0,12 0,61
( 8,38) ( 2,95) ( 2,82) ( 15,72)
Municipal roads Constant term.......................................................................................0,13 0,07 0,11 0,17
( 2,24) ( 2,22) ( 5,40) ( 4,30)
Amount of snowfall.......................................................................................0,03 0,07 0,08 0,09
( 2,87) ( 10,02) ( 17,04) ( 8,10)
Kilometers of municipal road.......................................................................................27,73 27,56 22,41 23,89
( 14,57) ( 22,43) ( 28,40) ( 20,35)
Water supply Constant term.......................................................................................0,70 0,88 1,31 1,07
and sanitation ( 21,24) ( 26,73) ( 45,00) ( 18,23)
Capacity of advanced purification.......................................................................................0,12 0,31 0,53 0,64
( 6,21) ( 13,35) ( 21,14) ( 16,89)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................-0,11 -0,05 0,12 0,51
( 2,77) ( 1,01) ( 3,32) ( 9,12)
Other Constant term.......................................................................................-1,01 0,63 1,01 1,26
infrastructure ( 2,83) ( 1,89) ( 9,08) ( 8,05)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................- - 2,08 1,62
- - ( 17,35) ( 14,62)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
 
Table C.2. Parameter estimates – model 2 
Sector Time period 1974-1982 1983-1990 1991-2000 2001-2008
Budget surplus Constant term.......................................................................................-1,07 -0,69 -2,13 -1,66
(3,23) (2,35) (14,24) (10,44)
Real growth in municipal income.......................................................................................1,81 0,48 0,53 0,54
(13,68) (9,99) (32,65) (39,96)
Administration Constant term.......................................................................................2,51 2,09 1,35 1,85
(43,14) (33,55) (16,15) (18,38)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................3,65 4,43 3,78 4,42
(68,78) (71,31) (52,90) (52,66)
Primary school Population in elementary school age.......................................................................................28,44 32,89 22,92 49,36
(15,61) (14,58) (13,82) (34,10)
Population 13-15 years of age.......................................................................................92,86 93,14 132,10 69,28
(24,12) (22,77) (35,79) (21,37)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district.......................................................................................1,19 1,16 0,78 1,14
(54,92) (53,46) (29,64) (38,34)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................4,06 3,70 1,54 2,19
(37,70) (34,70) (16,47) (30,27)
Other education Population in primary school age.......................................................................................6,01 6,37 1,50 2,32
(16,24) (27,48) (3,59) (6,84)
Children in child care age without full t ime working providers.......................................................................................- - 9,75 7,57
- - (9,84) (10,46)
Refugees living 5 years or less in Norway.......................................................................................- 14,49 10,27 36,73
- (7,68) (6,27) (35,73)
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Child Care Population in child care age.......................................................................................- 4,43 3,60 35,55
- (2,38) (2,33) (31,58)
Children in child care age without full t ime working providers.......................................................................................238,29 107,05 49,65 84,46
(30,57) (17,56) (14,50) (36,53)
Children in child care age with single provider.......................................................................................97,68 -10,94 8,27 5,99
(11,74) (1,70) (1,53) (1,51)
Health care Constant term.......................................................................................0,89 1,03 0,70 0,90
(7,93) (13,20) (12,09) (16,37)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district.......................................................................................0,00 0,25 0,29 0,33
(0,06) (6,93) (14,18) (16,27)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................0,45 1,54 1,15 1,68
(3,29) (23,10) (20,93) (40,70)
Social assistance Refugees living 5 years or less in Norway.......................................................................................- - 14,58 40,50
- - (15,23) (33,87)
Refugees living more than 5 years in Norway.......................................................................................- - 26,70 15,86
- - (9,11) (8,07)
Divorced/separated 16-59 years.......................................................................................39,46 24,56 10,68 4,36
(18,41) (25,23) (12,36) (5,91)
Unemployed 16-59 years.......................................................................................-10,75 0,07 7,67 4,85
(4,11) (0,07) (9,17) (4,18)
Number of poor.......................................................................................8,87 5,37 5,85 9,44
(15,74) (9,62) (9,68) (14,48)
Disablement pensioners 18-49 years of age.......................................................................................4,31 3,89 11,72 7,23
(1,71) (1,97) (7,73) (4,78)
Child protection Population less than 16 years of age.......................................................................................0,71 1,64 2,20 1,61
(2,95) (7,95) (14,46) (7,77)
Children less than 16 years of age with single provider.......................................................................................7,53 23,58 12,16 15,32
(2,34) (9,98) (7,55) (11,11)
Poor children less than 16 years of age.......................................................................................13,05 -2,96 8,21 7,39
(4,54) (1,00) (4,48) (4,86)
Long-term care Population less than 67 years of age.......................................................................................2,01 1,94 1,68 3,01
(3,17) (5,66) (6,47) (10,02)
Population 67-79 years of age.......................................................................................15,18 30,46 23,52 32,57
(2,23) (8,00) (9,83) (11,04)
Population 80-89 years of age.......................................................................................262,90 152,97 94,42 61,34
(12,28) (12,95) (16,73) (12,31)
Population more than 89 years of age.......................................................................................180,45 200,88 195,57 223,30
(2,86) (5,36) (10,36) (15,72)
Mentally disabled 16 years and above without grant.......................................................................................- - 311,22 233,26
- - (20,93) (13,67)
Mentally disabled 16 years and above with grant.......................................................................................- - 969,84 734,68
- - (88,45) (36,23)
Distance to centre of municipal sub-district.......................................................................................0,41 0,63 0,39 1,07
(2,54) (6,56) (5,63) (15,46)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................6,75 7,22 3,32 2,59
(20,74) (37,67) (19,19) (16,26)
Culture Constant term.......................................................................................1,05 0,87 0,67 0,82
(40,84) (25,71) (18,25) (16,59)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................0,38 0,11 0,09 0,52
(9,77) (2,88) (2,75) (15,66)
Municipal roads Constant term.......................................................................................0,16 0,09 0,06 0,15
(4,40) (3,71) (3,17) (5,36)
Amount of snowfall.......................................................................................0,02 0,05 0,06 0,05
(3,02) (9,90) (17,11) (8,46)
Kilometers of municipal road.......................................................................................21,27 23,00 20,10 18,34
(19,73) (27,53) (35,68) (23,63)
Water supply Constant term.......................................................................................1,21 1,14 1,10 0,99
and sanitation (26,65) (32,97) (39,72) (21,93)
Capacity of advanced purification.......................................................................................0,19 0,40 0,48 0,57
(6,07) (14,19) (23,97) (18,49)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................-0,20 -0,08 0,13 0,45
(3,29) (1,38) (4,09) (9,10)
Other Constant term.......................................................................................-0,29 0,26 0,72 1,18
infrastructure (2,25) (2,60) (8,03) (9,77)
Inverse population size.......................................................................................- - 2,28 1,23
- - (27,79) (12,71)
 T-values reported in parenthesis. All variables are measured in pro capita values. Coefficients are reported in thousands of 2008 
NOK 
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Appendix D: Time heterogeneity  
Figure D.1. Evolution of time coefficients 
 
 
Figure D.2. Evolution of sector specific expenditure indices 
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Appendix E: Minimum required expenditure 
Distribution of minimum required expenditure per service sector for each model in 
2008. 
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